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ABSTRACT 
Since the fall of communism in the late 80’s Poland has taken major steps 
forward and become one of the most successful transition economies. One 
significant economic change is that trade has been re-oriented away from the 
CEE and CIS countries towards Western Europe as a result of a liberalization 
of the economy. However, trade relations with eastern neighbors are growing 
and becoming more important. A major role in these relations is played by 
foreign-owned subsidiaries based in Poland. 
 
This study sets out to explore how these subsidiaries have internationalized and 
what the underlying explanations as well as future prospects for such 
development are. The main purpose of the study, which is limited to 
investigating market entry into Ukraine, is to create an understanding for the 
internationalization of subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. 
 
The main findings of the study show that the mainly market-oriented 
subsidiaries were established rapidly in Poland through large capital 
investments, which made them into group regional centers. The subsequent 
expansion into Ukraine revealed that the subsidiaries operated in a gradual 
manner and by low commitment, because of various subsidiary internal factors 
and due to an insecure and volatile Ukrainian transition environment. To 
manage the business activities network relationships were used extensively. No 
common pattern was found as an explanation for the subsidiaries’ initial entry 
into Ukraine. Because of the slow developing character of the transition process 
subsidiaries are within the near future believed to continue expanding into 
Ukraine in the same way as they do at present. 
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Chapter I 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter aims at giving the reader a picture of what is going 
to be studied within this thesis. First, the initial spark to what started the 
interest in the subject is presented. Second, some propositions concerning the 
thesis framework are revealed. The remaining part focuses on stating and 
explaining the problem definition, which has been divided into three research 
questions. 
1.1 Background 
1989 marked the fall of communism in Poland as the first free elections were 
held and a non-communist majority government was formed. This meant a new 
political and economic era for the country and was the start of a transition 
process from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy. Today, 
thirteen years have passed since the transformation of the economy began and a 
great deal has happened since that. As one of many Eastern European countries 
going though the same process, Poland has turned out as one of the most 
successful transition economies (EBRD, 2001) in its region in terms of 
economic and social reforms. 
 
The transition process has opened up the Polish economy for foreign 
companies. The level of foreign involvement and Poland’s integration into the 
global production system has increased year by year. In fact, Poland has over 
the past few years become the main target for foreign direct investment in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In 2000, the total FDI stock in Poland amounted to 
36,5 billion USD. The figure can be compared to 21 and 19,2 billion USD for 
the Czech Republic and Russia respectively (UNCTAD, 2001). 
 
The implication of the investments on foreign trade for CEE economies is that 
the bulk of trade, which formerly was within the Soviet block, has been re-
orientated away from the CEE and CIS countries towards Western Europe 
(Mercado et al., 2001). However, Polish trade relations with the former Soviet 
block are still noteworthy and actually growing in importance. Exports and 
imports with countries such as the members of the CEFTA and CIS have 
shown increasing growth rates during the past few years. Even if the Russian 
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crisis in 1998 decreased Polish trade with the CIS countries as a total, today the 
situation has changed for the better and the level of trade is higher than ever 
since free market economy was introduced in these countries in the late 80’s 
and beginning of the 90’s (Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1997-2002).  
 
An observation made at the World Bank (2001) is that there are indications that 
during the last few years Poland has established itself as a regional hub for 
some foreign companies that are expanding into the CIS and CEE. What can be 
seen is that the growing amount of subsidiaries of foreign companies entering 
and establishing production in Poland increasingly commit themselves to the 
neighboring markets and above all Ukraine and Russia, most notably by 
exporting. This means that instead of entering the CEE and CIS markets 
directly from the MNC’s country of origin these markets are penetrated by the 
subsidiaries active in Poland. 
 
In 2001, foreign-owned subsidiaries exported goods worth 1415 million USD 
to the member countries of CEE and CIS. The figure can be compared to 340 
million USD in 1996. Furthermore, the share of the foreign-owned companies 
in total exports to CEE and CIS has increased from 27,5 % to 46 % during the 
five years. The figures indicate that foreign owed subsidiaries in Poland have 
started a broad scale penetration of the neighboring eastern markets. 
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Figure 1 – Polish Exports to CEE and CIS 
Source: Calculations based on Foreign Trade Research Institute (1997-2002) 
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There is really no organization, public nor private, in Poland that monitors 
Polish outward investments and therefore there is a huge lack of knowledge in 
this area. In an investigation conducted by Gazeta Wyborcza (2002), the largest 
Polish daily newspaper, Polish embassies in CEE as well as in the CIS 
countries were contacted and questioned about the size of Polish investments in 
their respective countries. The results showed that the largest amounts of 
investments have gone to Ukraine and Russia followed by Lithuania and the 
Czech Republic. 
 
According to the Ukrainian-Polish Center for Cooperation (www.upcfc.org, 
2002), which bases its statistics on the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Polish 
direct investments in Ukraine have shown a steady increase since 1995 when 
Polish investments amounted to 13,7 million USD. In the beginning of 2001 
the level of aggregated investment had increased to 62,1 million USD. 
Increasing Polish outward FDI, especially to Ukraine, should indicate that there 
is increasing interest for companies active in Poland to launch manufacturing in 
Ukraine. Even if the case of Ukraine shows a positive development, the overall 
Polish outward investment remains at very low levels. 
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Figure 2 – Polish Accumulated FDI Inflow to Ukraine 1995-2001 
Source: www.upcfc.org, 2002 
 
Furthermore, the research made by Gazeta Wyborcza (2002) showed that there 
are today already 200 Polish firms that have started production in Ukraine. 
However, how many of these firms include capital of foreign subsidiaries in 
Poland and how large the overall investments that have been made in Ukraine 
by the foreign-owned subsidiaries is unknown. Considering the high level of 
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exports that are generated by these subsidiaries it would be reasonable to 
presume that they would also have a certain share in the direct investments. 
 
The discussion above has shown that there is a new trade and investment 
pattern emerging between Poland and its regional neighbors where subsidiaries 
of foreign firms play an important role. This has developed Poland into a 
regional hub meaning a center from which several foreign subsidiaries expand 
through at least exporting operations into neighboring countries. Thus, an 
interesting question that arises is what leads to this development In other 
words, how do they establish and develop international business activities? 
 
1.2 Research Problem Discussion 
To the authors knowledge there is no specific explanation as to why 
subsidiaries internationalize. It is not known if firm internationalization theory 
is able to explain such a phenomenon. The two most broadly excepted theories 
on firm internationalization would offer differing explanations for how and 
why subsidiaries of foreign firms have expanded their operations from Poland 
into CEE and CIS. 
 
First, the internationalization process view as developed mainly by scholars at 
the University of Uppsala would propose that the reason why these markets are 
entered from Poland was because of acceptable and manageable differences in 
culture, business practices and institutions. Furthermore, the markets could 
have attracted the companies by their size and future potential. 
 
Due to a lack of knowledge about the CEE and CIS markets the subsidiaries 
would be cautious when entering them. As the firms learn the realities about 
these markets - acquire market experience - by operating in them they would 
increase their commitments to them in a step-by-step process. First, their 
foreign sales would be handled by different modes of exports and later they 
would continue increasing their level of commitment and in some cases end up 
opening production facilities. However, exceptions could occur and the firms 
could have penetrated the markets faster in case they controlled large resources, 
 14 
 
Chapter I 
the markets were stable and experience from similar markets had been 
previously acquired. 
 
The other widely accepted theoretical approach concerning firm 
internationalization (created by among other Johanson and Mattsson, 1998) is 
based on theories about industrial networks. Instead of looking at independent 
markets as the process model does, internationalization in the network view is 
considered to emerge when the firm establishes a market position in a foreign 
network. The theory has been widely used as an explanation in cases where 
firms have shown rapid internationalization, which previously was not 
considered possible to fully explain with the process model. 
 
Thus, the network theory of internationalization would suggest that what 
markets further east the Polish subsidiary enters is completely the outcome of 
what new relationships are established with Eastern European firms. The size 
of the market or psychic distance is not interesting in this perspective. Instead a 
central factor is relation-specific distance. However, since it is not known what 
relationships will be established the theory does not say anything about where 
or how a firm would internationalize. 
 
In a forthcoming article by Johansson and Vahlne (2002) the authors develop a 
network model of the firm internationalization process, which embraces the 
basic mechanism from the old process model and incorporates it into the 
network perspective. Thus, it is expected that internationalization occurs as a 
result of an experimental learning-commitment mechanism, however, which 
instead applies to network relationships. Relationships with new Eastern 
European counterparts would therefore primarily be built in an incremental 
character. However, this does not mean that firms cannot enter new markets 
rapidly and that there would have to be a chain of operation modes. It is rather 
a description of a necessary process with regards to the relationship before a 
commitment is done. 
 
Thus, the above-mentioned theories give suggestions to alternatives of why the 
foreign-owned subsidiaries in Eastern Europe would internationalize. The 
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Uppsala-school would also very clearly suggest how the subsidiaries were to 
internationalize. 
 
Previously done studies on market entry and expansion in Eastern Europe 
offers some propositions of how this process would evolve based on what has 
been recorded from earlier investigations. Looking into existing theory about 
how business activities are conducted in Eastern Europe can therefore give 
some more hints about the realities of these markets and hence help to 
understand the underlying situation. 
 
Nieminen (1999) concludes that doing business in Eastern Europe is a difficult 
task for western enterprises. According to his research the cause for this is the 
turbulent business environment that has been caused by the transformation 
process. Since transformation began at different stages in these countries they 
are all at different stages. Thus, foreign firms expanding into the Visegrad 
Countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – that are 
considered to be more stable would prefer high commitment operating modes 
such as wholly owned subsidiaries. Thus, they would expose themselves to 
higher risk. On the other hand, foreign enterprises entering CIS-country 
markets are believed to favor low commitment modes since the markets are 
more unstable and risky. Hence, preferred modes would be, for example, 
traditional export-import operations, sales subsidiaries or joint ventures. 
 
Furthermore, due to instability taking advantage of relationships in local 
networks in order to bridge the institutional insufficiencies in foremost the CIS-
markets would be common. 
 
Research made by Vahlne et al (1993) reveals interesting findings concerning 
how firms would expand into Eastern European markets. According to the 
study it would be expected that foreign investors start off by employing low 
commitment modes and later increase investments to form higher 
commitments. The findings are said to be in line with what the Uppsala-model 
suggests. Hence, starting with, for example, sales subsidiaries and gradually 
increasing commitment until production would be reached. 
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The introductory statistics have shown that foreign-owned subsidiaries in 
Poland establish themselves in Ukraine. Since there exists no explanation to 
how this process starts and develops some initial propositions have been 
presented here. To challenge these the following problem definition has been 
defined. 
1.3 Problem Definition 
Main Question: 
How does a foreign-owned subsidiary in Poland establish and develop 
business activities in other transition markets and what are the 
explanations as well as future prospects for such expansion? 
 
The main question has been divided into three research questions in order to 
clarify it and enable a more structured analysis in the end of the study. Thus 
first, to increase the understanding of this process it would be reasonable to 
investigate a MNC’s initial entry into the transition country from where its 
subsidiary started to expand. This should be seen as a background explanation 
with the purpose of increasing the understanding of further development. 
 
I. How and with what intentions was the initial market entry into 
Poland made? 
 
Whether the firm’s intentions where the one or the other, it is not known what 
brought its subsidiary to the following market. Thus, a second research 
question is posed in order to explain the subsidiary’s entry and development 
within another transition economy. This question is the center of this study. 
Hence, it follows and should challenge the stated propositions. 
 
II. How and why does a foreign-owned subsidiary in Poland establish 
and develop a market position in additional transition markets? 
 
As a final research question the issue of what is going to happen to the firm and 
its future expansion within transition markets is brought into light. 
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III. What are the major operational barriers and how do they affect 
further expansion into the transition markets in the near future? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to create an understanding and to describe how and 
why Polish-based subsidiaries of MNCs have internationalized in Eastern 
Europe. Since this is probably one of the first studies of subsidiary 
internationalization this thesis should form a basic understanding of what the 
phenomenon is about. 
 
Since entering new markets through subsidiaries is not the most common type 
of market entry this study presents an alternative way of penetrating and 
expanding a company’s operations. 
 
The research should also contribute to an increased awareness of how 
internationalization processes are managed and developed in the environments 
of emerging markets as well as test and challenge previous findings about 
market entry and development in Eastern Europe. 
 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
First of all, the starting point in the exploration of a MNC’s activities in Eastern 
Europe is Poland. Thus, Poland is the country from where the subsidiaries 
should have started their internationalization. Second, Ukraine was chosen as 
the destination country. 
 
The reason why the study is limited to one destination country is to enhance the 
comparison of the individual expansion processes. Transition economies have 
several common characteristics. However, since the beginning of the 
transformation processes the individual countries have started to diverge from 
each other most importantly politically, legally and economically due to 
variations in transformation progress. Thus, focusing on one destination 
country should make the subsidiaries’ behavior more understandable since they 
are studied in the context of one environment. 
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Since this is a behavioral study its focus lies within the individual companies 
and their experiences as well as perceptions concerning expansion processes. In 
transition economies these processes are still believed to be highly dependent 
on the characteristics that are typical in transition environments. This thesis 
focuses on the most common of such characteristics found in the business 
literature. 
 
Therefore less attention is given to market specifics of Ukraine. Instead a 
subsidiary’s behavior will be mainly explained in relation to the existing 
findings about doing business in transition economies, as a general description 
concerning a group of Eastern European countries. Thus, there will therefore be 
no extensive descriptions of the market characteristics in Ukraine as a 
framework for this study. 
 
In the initial stages of this thesis project the purpose was to limit the study to 
Swedish companies. However, as the work progressed and it was time to search 
for case companies it was realized that the amount of Swedish companies that 
were exporting or had invested in Ukraine through Poland was limited. 
Therefore, a decision was taken to broaden the scope to include all western 
MNCs. 
 
The general theories that are used to create the framework of this study are the 
Uppsala and the Network model. The motive for the choice of these theories is 
twofold. First, since network relationships in Eastern Europe are considered to 
be highly important for foreign firms operating there, as stated by Törnroos and 
Nieminen (1999), theories about networks should provide important insights. 
 
Furthermore, both theories have received high popularity and acceptance 
among a wide group of scholars.  Even if the Uppsala model has several times 
been classified as outdated it is believed that it might be advantageous here 
when studying the Eastern European context. Due to its explanatory power and 
prediction of gradual internationalization processes, which coincides with a 
similar proposition presented earlier in this thesis, it should hopefully add to the 
understanding of the studied processes. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
The following methodology chapter explains how and under what conditions 
this thesis was written. This is done in order to enable the reader to trace how 
the author went about when conducting his research. First, a number of major 
fundamental research issues are raised, followed by the data collection 
procedure and the quality of the research. 
2.1 Research Paradigm 
Merriam (1998) differentiates between three research orientations positivism, 
interpretative research and critical research. All three represent different ways 
of looking at reality. The author illustrates the difference between them by 
defining education with each of them. The positivist perspective is about 
making research, education or schooling the objective. It is thought that 
knowledge acquired by scientific and experimental research can be objectified 
and quantified. On the other hand, in interpretative research one looks at 
education as a process and an experience for the one who attends it. Thus, 
understanding education as a process or experience is the knowledge that can 
be attained from this worldview. The approach in such research is often 
inductive, hypothesis- as well as theory generating. Furthermore, it assumes 
that all individuals create their own realities. Critical research would depict 
education as a social institution and would thus mainly focus on how the 
institution is structured.  
 
Since the purpose of this research is to increase the understanding of how 
companies internationalize through their subsidiaries seen as an evolving 
process it becomes obvious that the research orientation should be 
interpretative. Hence, there is no interest in studying how companies are 
structured as institutions nor to conduct experiments on how companies would 
behave in certain situations as critical research and positivism would suggest. 
 
2.2 Research Method 
According to Merriam (1998) interpretative research can be also labeled as 
qualitative research. The focus of such research is to “understand and explain 
21 
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the meaning of social phenomena with as little disruption of the natural setting 
as possible.” The research method is based on the assumption that human 
beings create reality as they interact with their social worlds. Thus, qualitative 
research tries to reveal and explain things that have been constructed by people. 
In order to analyze these creations human beings are the key data sources in 
qualitative studies and therefore field work is a very common means of 
collecting data.  
 
Another research method is quantitative research. Instead of aiming at giving 
explanations to people’s realities it tries to take apart a phenomenon and 
examine various components of it. The components are then used as variables 
in the study. The objective in quantitative research is rather to measure or 
quantify a certain phenomenon. 
 
Firm internationalization processes are certainly social constructions that are 
controlled and developed by human beings. Therefore, understanding how they 
work in a certain context, as expressed in the purpose of this study, is a 
complicated matter, which requires a thorough investigation of the process as a 
whole. It would of course be possible to conduct a quantitative study of 
internationalization processes and in fact it is quite common. However, the 
objective of this study is not to quantify the number of occurrences of a certain 
phenomenon such as choice of entry mode. Instead this study attempts to 
explain why certain operation modes are used in a context that offers several 
rather complicated explanations. Thus, the qualitative research method is 
preferred over the quantitative. 
 
Qualitative research usually follows an inductive research method (Merriam, 
1998). Rather than testing existing theory inductive research tries to build 
abstractions, concepts and theories from empirical findings. This method is 
usually used when there is a lack of a theoretical frame of reference or when 
the existing theories do not explain a certain occurrence. Therefore, it is not 
possible to construct a hypothesis out of obtainable theoretical reasoning. The 
opposite of inductive research is deductive research, which instead is based on 
existing theory and knowledge. The researcher’s starting point is then what is 
known about a certain occurrence. Thus, he hopes to find data that explains his 
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propositions in contrast to the inductive researcher who attempts to formulate 
theory from his findings. Abductive research can be seen as a combination of 
the two previous ones. Together with the empirical findings as a point of 
departure and existing theoretical frameworks the investigator is able to 
formulate hypothetical propositions that can be tested. This method is 
advantageous when there is a phenomenon that the researcher wants to 
illuminate by applying certain theories as a basis. 
 
The initial start and interest of this study emerged out of a statistical depiction, 
which proposed that there was a new trade and investment pattern forming 
between Poland and its CEE and CIS neighbors. Moreover, it was noted that a 
major role in this development was played by foreign-owned subsidiaries that 
were operating in Poland. Thus, the early phase of this study was inductive in 
the sense that the statistical findings gave birth to conceptualizations about this 
emerging pattern by looking at what explanations existing theories of firm 
internationalization could give to the phenomenon. Subsequently, the 
internationalization theories came to stand in the center of the study as the 
research questions were derived from them. Thus, the remaining study is based 
on testing the propositions and hence the major part of the study is deductive. 
Since both the inductive and deductive method is used, the study should be 
considered abductive. 
 
2.3 Research Approach 
A research approach describes the investigator’s intent with the research as 
well as nature of the case studies. Yin (1994) categorizes three different 
research approaches exploratory, explanatory and descriptive. Exploratory 
research is most commonly used in the initial stages of a study when the 
researcher aims at finding a research problem or developing his research 
problem and making it more explicit. The research approach can also be used to 
evaluate performance or as a method for gaining more knowledge concerning 
further research. 
 
Explanatory research on the other hand attempts to establish various 
explanations for the same phenomenon and tries to assess when it will be 
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possible to apply the explanations in another situation. Thus, explanatory 
research aims at explaining why one event leads to the other and therefore it 
deals with cause-effect relationships. 
 
Descriptive research aims at presenting detailed information about a 
phenomenon under study. Thus, a historical case study is nothing more than a 
description of a chain of events (Merriam, 1998). 
 
This thesis follows mainly an explanatory research approach. The main 
question as well as the various research questions that have been posed aim at 
finding an explanation for why firms decide to take certain action, for example, 
choosing a certain operation mode. 
 
2.4 Research Strategy 
There are several research strategies to lean on when conducting studies in 
social sciences. Yin (1994) mentions and discusses case studies, experiments, 
surveys, histories and the analysis of archival information. A key question that 
the researcher has to deal with is which of the above-mentioned strategies to 
choose from in order to answer a research problem as favorably as possible. 
Each one of them implies a different way of collecting data and analyzing the 
empirical findings. Furthermore, they all have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. The goal is to avoid gross misfits, which would be the situation 
if a research strategy was chosen, although another strategy would be more 
appropriate or advantageous. However, research strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, which means that a researcher can actually use more than one 
strategy in any given study. 
 
To come to grips with which research strategy to choose three conditions 
should be looked into. First and foremost, the type of research question posed. 
Second, the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events. 
Third, the degree of focus the research questions have on contemporary or 
historical events. 
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Type of research questions can be categorized by “what,” “who,” “where,” 
“how” and “why” questions. Using any of the five research strategies can solve 
questions that begin with ”what” and are exploratory in their nature such as; 
”What are the ways of making schools effective?” However, a “what” 
questions can also be a form of “how many” and “how much” inquiries that 
require some kind of quantification and are therefore usually most preferably 
tackled with the help of survey or archival strategies. This is also true for 
“who” and “where” questions. Surveys and analysis of archival records are thus 
well suited when the goal is to describe the incidence or prevalence of a 
phenomenon. Moreover, they can be used in predictions about certain 
outcomes. 
 
“How” and “why” questions are considered to be more explanatory than the 
previous types. Their aim is to explain operational links, which need to be 
traced over time. Therefore, the research strategies most appropriate for such 
inquiries are case studies, histories and experiments. 
 
Looking further into the conditions that should decide which research strategy 
to choose the researcher has to conclude what control he has over behavioral 
events and if the focus of his study is on contemporary events. If behavior can 
be manipulated directly, precisely and systematically and the research is on 
current issues the choice should be experiments. On the other hand, when there 
is no control over the events and the focus is on past events the researcher 
should make use of either history or archival analysis. In the case of archival 
analysis the focus can also be on current events. When it comes to surveys and 
case studies there is no need of control over events, but the focus of the 
research should be on contemporary issues. 
 
Applying the framework from above on this thesis reveals that the case study 
approach should be the most appropriate strategy for challenging the problem 
statement. First of all, the main problem as well as most of the research 
problems are formulated as “how” and “why” questions. The posed questions 
clearly point out that the area that is going to be investigated concerns 
processes, to be more precise expansion processes in Eastern Europe. Since the 
focus is on contemporary happenings rather and there is no control over the 
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behavioral events the alternatives are narrowed down to the case study. Some 
of the questions are, however, formulated as “what” questions and do not at 
first sight seem to fit the chosen research strategy. Nevertheless, the questions 
are closely related to the studied processes and should therefore not be 
extracted from their context i.e. they are explanatory in the context. The 
purpose of this thesis is neither to try to quantify the types of entry modes used 
nor hurdles in the entry process, but to clarify how they appear in different 
circumstances in the context of the whole process. 
 
As stated by Yin (1994) a case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.” The definition itself points out the strength of case studies being the 
desire to understand complex phenomena in an unclear context, thus highly 
applicable in this study given that the Eastern European markets create an 
insecure environment for western enterprises that want to establish business 
activities in the region. 
 
Case studies have also received criticism concerning inconsistency of its 
investigators ability to handle the research strategy. Carelessness and 
generation of biased views have in too many situations influenced the findings 
and conclusions. Moreover, it has been claimed that case studies do not provide 
enough evidence for generalization, although there exists a way of generalizing  
to theoretical propositions. Case studies are also said to take too long time to 
conduct and result in long unreadable documents. Despite these accusations it 
is believed that the case study will provide the best prerequisites for this study 
since its advantages appear to hold very strong in comparison with the other 
research strategies. 
 
2.4.1 Case Study Design 
Designing case studies means to form the logical link between the questions 
that are posed and the data collection process as well as the conclusions that 
will be drawn. All case studies include a research design either of implicit or 
explicit nature. The researcher basically has four alternatives. First, a decision 
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has to be made about doing single-case or multiple-case designs. Thereafter, a 
choice is made if the single or multiple designs should be holistic (i.e. include a 
single unit of analysis) or embedded (meaning that multiple units of analysis 
should be incorporated). No design is superior to another since they all have 
their advantages and disadvantages. It is the purpose of the study that should 
decide what design is the most appropriate to use. 
 
If a researcher aims at testing a well-formulated theory he might be interested 
in analyzing a critical case, which should fulfill several characteristics related 
to the posed research questions as well as the developed theory and thus make 
it an interesting case to study. This would allow a developed theory to be 
examined and expanded in detail. The researcher might also find an extreme or 
unique case, which could be interesting to study and to challenge existing 
theory with. Such cases could reveal interesting findings and lead to startling 
conclusions due to their unusual nature. Similar findings could be expected 
from a revelatory case, which represents a previously non-existent 
phenomenon. 
 
The use of multiple-cases is generally viewed as more forceful and producing 
stronger evidence. However, single-cases can satisfy certain needs that cannot 
be met by the multiple-case approach e.g. the analysis of one unique case. This 
implies that a multiple-case study is necessarily not superior to a single one. 
 
Conducting multiple-cases can be compared to doing multiple experiments 
where the target is to reproduce the same result over and over again. Thus, the 
multiple-case approach follows a replication logic, in which each case predicts 
similar results (literal replication) or produces contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (theoretical replication) i.e. either the single cases support 
the theory that is challenged or they do not but for expected reasons. In the first 
instance strong empirical support is found for the existing theory. In the latter 
theory has to be questioned and developed. Thus, literal and theoretical 
replication represents two ways of testing the initial proposition or theory in a 
study. 
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Due to the advantages of the replication effect multiple-cases in this thesis are 
preferred over a single-case study. This study tries more to develop new theory 
on the basis of existing theory than to test a theory. Therefore, it is more 
advantageous to conduct multiple cases and to make theoretical replications 
based on the given propositions. Making a single study of a critical, unique or 
revelatory case that could challenge an existing theory is therefore not 
interesting. 
 
2.4.2 Selection of Case Companies 
Selecting and finding the proper cases to this study was a really complicated 
and time-consuming matter. The main reason for this is that no person, list or 
database, at least to the author’s knowledge was able to point out several firms 
or subsidiaries that would fulfill the initial main criterion of this study. The 
sought after actor had to be a foreign-owned subsidiary in Poland that in 
addition was present in Ukraine through investments. The search for such 
actors began by contacting all relevant institutions such as the Polish Agency of 
Foreign Investment, trade chambers and governmental bodies, business schools 
etc. 
 
However, the only interesting actors that were found were subsidiaries that 
were exporting from Poland. As the search continued three foreign-owned 
subsidiaries that had invested in Ukraine were found. The procedure that led to 
the discoveries were lists of investments that had been made in Poland by 
foreign companies whose websites were screened for presence in Ukraine. 
Another source that was fruitful was the highly appreciated help of the two 
Polish professors Bolesław Domański at the Jagellonian University in Cracow 
and Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz at the University of Poznań. 
 
Still, only three subsidiaries were first found this way. Since the planned 
amount of cases was slightly higher a decision was taken to change the 
criterion and also include subsidiaries that were so far only on an exporting 
level. This was an easy task since there were plenty of such firms. As the cases 
had been completed it turned out that one of the subsidiaries that was supposed 
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to be only exporting had in fact made a contractual agreement in Ukraine and 
thus was actually on a higher level than thought. 
 
Afterwards, it is more understandable why finding the after sought firms was 
difficult. Since even when the targeted subsidiaries make a commitment on the 
level of production they seem to be of low character. Contractual agreements, 
for example, do no necessitate any kind of capital investment. Therefore, it is 
hard for anybody to keep track of such commitments. 
 
2.5 Data Collection 
Data can basically be structured in two groups primary and secondary data. 
Primary data is data that has been collected for a specific study and purpose. 
On the other hand, secondary data originates from a previously done inquiry 
and does therefore already exist somewhere waiting to be used by somebody 
else. Normally when an investigator starts researching he begins by looking for 
secondary data in order to solve his problem partly or even wholly, since the 
collection of primary data is usually a costly operation. Secondary data sources 
include company internal sources, governmental publications, periodicals and 
book, the Internet and commercial data provided by certain companies (Kotler, 
1997). 
 
2.5.1 Primary Data 
In this study the primary data was collected through nine interviews that were 
conducted in relation to seven case companies mainly at their headquarters in 
Poland. Geographically seen the companies were rather evenly spread around 
the whole country, which meant a lot of traveling. The interviews were made 
with people who according to company sources had the best experience from 
dealing with the expansion into Ukraine. The respondents had either been 
responsible for the subsidiary’s operations in Ukraine or had worked very 
closely with the market for several years, usually from the beginning of the 
operations. Their positions varied from being CEOs to export managers. 
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Generally speaking the interviews were conducted under good conditions and 
in an open atmosphere. The type of questions that were posed had an open-
ended character but followed a certain pattern, which aimed at analyzing the 
internationalization process in a chronological order i.e. first the subsidiary’s 
entry into Poland and secondly the expansion into Ukraine. An open-ended 
nature of the questions was preferred since each and every person has his own 
view of reality and therefore it was believed that the interviews would be more 
fruitful and provide valuable insights if the respondent was able to speak more 
freely about his own view. Thus, the interviews could according to Merriam 
(1998) be classified as semi-structured i.e. a mix of more- and less-structured 
questions. 
 
Furthermore, during the interviews it was noticed that in order to capture and 
cover the main issues a whole lot of flexibility was required, which meant that 
several additional questions that were not included in the question sheet had to 
be posed. These were often questions that tried to deepen the knowledge about 
some case-specific issues that the respondent had answered to in a rather 
concise manner. 
 
The author’s perception is that all the respondents were very knowledgeable 
about their companies’ situation on the Ukrainian market, which they had much 
to tell and explain about. All interviews were recorded in order to guarantee the 
largest possible amount of data from the interviews. Moreover, considering that 
the average interview lasted approximately one and a half hours a whole lot of 
valuable information was gathered. 
 
2.5.2 Secondary Data 
Since this study focuses on a part of a company, a subsidiary, secondary data 
sources were only available to a limited extent. Information that was found 
about the Polish subsidiaries was mainly used to double-check the information 
that had been colleted during the interviews. This data consisted largely of 
different publications on the Internet, which in many cases could have not been 
regarded as reliable sources and was therefore not used in the cases. What was 
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possible was to write some introductory group and subsidiary facts by using 
some companies’ websites. 
 
In one of the case studies, Wavin-Metalplast-Buk, the group’s entry into Poland 
had been documented in a previous academic study (Törnroos and Nieminen, 
1999), which was used in the case in order to save interview time to the more 
important part about Wavin’s entry into Ukraine. The reason to include the case 
in this study was that it covered the gap in a satisfying way and was considered 
highly reliable due to the high authority of the persons who had completed the 
study. 
 
2.6 Quality of Research 
2.6.1 Internal Validity 
According to Merriam (1998) internal validity concerns the measurement of 
how the findings in a study converge with reality. Since the conception of 
reality in qualitative research is very subjective in nature measuring what really 
is out there is impossible due to the fact that everybody has his own way of 
looking at reality. Thus, measuring validity is about assessing people’s 
understanding of the world. The author proposes six methods that can be used 
in an effort to increase internal validity. The first tactic is to make use of 
triangulation. The researcher can use multiple investigators, multiple data 
sources or several methods of confirming the findings e.g. by using external 
sources to validate the material. 
 
Another tactic is to do a member-check where data and interpretations are 
handed over to the people from were they originate and letting them evaluate or 
confirm them. A recommendation is to do it continuously during the research 
process. Third, the researcher can do long-term observations, which enables the 
data to be gathered over a period of time and thus increasing validity. As the 
fourth method the investigator may ask his colleagues on comments about the 
findings, termed peer examination. 
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An additional idea is to take advantage of participatory or collaborative modes 
of research to let all the participants in the study be part in the whole research 
process i.e. from the very beginning of the study to writing the findings. 
Finally, the researcher can as a means of enhancing internal validity clarify his 
worldview, assumptions and theoretical ideas i.e. reveal his biases. 
 
Since this study has been conducted by only one investigator the possibility of 
confirming and discussing the empirical findings with participating researchers 
has not been possible. Of course, this can be seen as a disadvantage. However, 
there is also a positive aspect to this. Doing interviews in foreign countries does 
create barriers that can be related to language and culture and thus can harm the 
validity and reliability of a study. However, as the author is well acquainted 
with the Polish culture and language due to his Polish heritage it was possible 
to conduct the interviews in the interviewees’ native languages. It is believed 
that this allowed a closer and more direct contact with the respondents then in 
the case the interviews had been conducted in English. Although English is 
becoming more usual in Poland it is not the first language and will therefore 
always create a barrier in a relationship. 
 
Furthermore, for most of the companies there was the opportunity to use more 
than one source of data. First, the author was able to interview not only one but 
two persons at some subsidiaries. During the second interviews a chance was 
given to double-check the information that had been received from the first 
interview. In addition, other valuable perspectives of the same 
internationalization process were collected. 
 
A second data source and way of confirming the empirical finding was by 
comparing them with several news publications that were found on the Internet 
in various e-newspapers and bulletins. An advantage was that before the 
interviews were carried out some material on certain cases had already been 
collected from the mentioned secondary sources and therefore allowed the 
author to focus and prepare questions on specific issues of interest. 
 
To detect and avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations the empirical 
findings in this study were sent to the respondents for a check on the accuracy 
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of the descriptions on the internationalization processes, which in some cases 
were rather complex. The complexities occurred form the nature of the studied 
processes, which included not only the Polish subsidiaries, but also other 
national units of the companies or close partners in other countries. These 
parties had to be taken into account in the study because they in many cases 
fulfilled important corner stones in a subsidiary’s expansion into Ukraine. 
However, response was bad and only a few were returned. 
 
2.6.2 External Validity 
External validity has to do with the possibility of generalizing the findings from 
a certain study on other cases. When generalizations are made with the help of 
case studies the findings should be generalized to existing theory. This is not 
easily done by using one case. Instead the researcher usually has to replicate the 
same finding a second or even a third time in order to create a solid base for a 
generalization to other cases. Thus, using multiple case studies is a way of 
getting better external validity (Yin, 1994). 
 
Merriam (1998) reveals that in order to even discuss external validity, internal 
validity has to be high. This is believed to be the case since the findings have 
been verified in several ways. Thus, conducting seven cases and theoretical 
replications in this study has allowed a higher level of external validity or 
generalizability, which is further discussed in the conclusions. 
 
2.6.3 Construct Validity 
Construct validity focuses basically on how well a study has measured the 
change factors of analysis. Thus, this is about finding the right tool for 
measuring a certain phenomenon and therefore the first step for the investigator 
is to choose the change that is going to be studied. Subsequently, it has to be 
shown that the selected measures really are going to represent the changes that 
are studied. The investigator could improve construct validity by using multiple 
sources, establishing a chain of evidence or letting key informants review the 
study (Yin, 1994). 
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As the current study aims to analyze how foreign-owned subsidiaries in a 
country internationalize, two theories, the process theory and the network 
theory of internationalization, are used as a way of expressing and explaining 
the changes that take place. The chosen theories are not perfect nor do they 
clarify every aspect of internationalization. However, the theories are among 
the most accepted and used in the academic world. Their strength lies in the 
ability to capture various types of internationalization processes and therefore 
they are seen as favorable here e.g. compared to the transaction cost approach. 
Since they represent two different views of firm internationalization it is 
believed that this will broaden the scope of analysis of the targeted processes. 
 
2.6.4 Reliability 
Reliability is about the likelihood that the research finding could be reproduced 
when somebody else conducted the same study at another point of time. Thus, 
if a replication of the study would give the same results as the previous one 
then the reliability would be high. The concept is based on the belief that there 
is only one reality, which can be depicted. However, since this is not the case in 
social sciences the concept becomes problematic to a certain extent, again, 
because the quality of the information that is gathered depends on the person 
who did it. Therefore, measuring reliability is more a question of whether the 
results are consistent with data that was collected. There are also methods of 
enhancing reliability in a study. The researcher could explain his position by 
describing his assumptions, the underlying theory, position in relation to the 
studied unit, why certain informants were chosen and describe them as well as 
refer to the social context during the data collection. 
 
A further method of improvement of validity is possible through an audit trial. 
This is done by explaining to the reader how the investigator reasoned and 
came up with his results. Therefore, he has to show how he collected data, how 
categories were derived and how he took his decisions. Again, triangulation 
could also be used (Merriam 1998). In this thesis all the processes of gathering, 
presenting and analyzing data are made available to the reader in different 
chapters. Thus, he is free to draw his own conclusions. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theories that are brought up in the following section of this paper are 
aimed at creating a framework for collecting, analyzing and drawing 
conclusions from the empirical findings. Thus, they create an analytical space 
to which this thesis is limited. 
3.1 The Uppsala Internationalization Model 
In the late 70s Johanson and Vahlne (1977) published an article on the firm 
internationalization process, which presented a theory that has become known 
as the Uppsala Internationalization Model. The focus of the model is on the 
development of the individual firm. Particular attention is given to the firm’s 
incremental knowledge development about foreign markets and operations as 
well as to the increasing commitment to foreign markets. The theory 
presupposes that the lack of knowledge creates a hurdle for establishing foreign 
activities and that a prerequisite for overcoming the necessary knowledge is 
primarily through operations abroad. Firm internationalization is therefore seen 
from two perspectives. First, an enterprise can increase its involvement in a 
foreign market. Second, operations can be established successively in new 
individual markets. 
 
3.1.1 Establishment Chain 
The theory that was presented had its foundations in previous research done in 
the area, primarily at the Uppsala University. These studies had shown that 
companies develop and extend their international operations in small steps, 
which create an establishment chain. In this process four different stages of 
involvement can be distinguished (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975): 
 
1. no regular export activities 
2. export via independent representatives (agents) 
3. sales subsidiary and 
4. production/manufacturing 
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At the beginning of the internationalization phase companies typically start by 
non-regular exporting. As the exports increase they start to use agents. Later 
companies decide to establish their own sales subsidiaries and finally there are 
the cases were production is established abroad. The first step implies that the 
company has made no commitments to another market and that there is no 
regular information channel established with the foreign market. The initial 
market commitment is realized as the agent relationship is set up and thus the 
firm starts to receive fairly regular information about sales influencing factors. 
In the third phase the establishment of a sales subsidiary allows the company to 
control the information channel and decide the type and amount of information 
to be collected about the market. The final step represents an even larger 
resource commitment. 
 
It is not expected that a firm has to go through all the steps in the establishment 
chain. Some companies never reach the higher levels of commitment since they 
lack the needed resources. Furthermore, some firms are expected to jump over 
certain steps in the process due to previous experiences from foreign markets. 
 
3.1.2 Psychic Distance 
Prior research in firm internationalization processes has furthermore shown that 
there normally is a chronological pattern of successive establishment of 
operations in new markets that corresponded to the psychic distance from the 
home market to the host market. Markets that are psychically closer are usually 
entered first. Psychic distance is believed to emerge from several factors and is 
defined as something that prevents the flow of information between the home 
and the foreign market. Herein lie differences between languages, education, 
business practices, culture and industrial development. Since the factors change 
over time psychic distance cannot be considered constant. 
 
However, not only psychic distance affects the choice of which markets a 
company will enter. Another factor that is regarded important is market size or 
market opportunity. A firm may either choose to enter large markets or smaller 
markets. The motivation to enter a smaller market may be that it is more similar 
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to the company’s home market and would require smaller amounts of resource 
commitments as well as contain less competitive industries. 
 
3.1.3 A Model of the Firm Internationalization Process 
In an attempt to explain the internationalization process of firms Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977) created a model that described the basic mechanism of 
internationalization and which included a state and a change aspect. The model 
shows that the two state aspects market knowledge and market commitment 
affect the change aspects commitment decisions and how current activities are 
preformed. Thus, the two change aspects then lead to a change in market 
knowledge and market commitment and thus an ongoing causal cycle is 
created. The model holds two assumptions. First, firms are considered to strive 
to increase long-term profit, which in the model is equaled with growth. 
Second, companies are seen as risk aversive and therefore pursue low risk-
taking. 
 
 
Figure 3 - The Basic Mechanism of Internationalization – State and Change Aspect 
Source: Johanson and Vahlne, 1977 
 
Market commitment in the model is made up by the amount of recourses 
committed and the degree of commitment. The amount of recourses refers to 
the size of the investments made in marketing, organization, personnel etc. The 
concept of the degree of commitment is slightly more complicated. Normally, 
an investment that is made by a company in a foreign market is considered to 
be a committed to that market. The more difficult it is to find an alternative use 
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for the committed resources and to transform them for a new purpose, the 
higher is the degree of resource commitment. In some cases though, it can be 
easy for a company to sell its assets and use the financial resources for another 
investment. Then the degree of resource commitment is low. Generally 
speaking, the more the resources committed to a foreign market are integrated 
with other units of the international firm with whom integrated activities are 
important, the higher is the degree of commitment. 
 
The concept of market knowledge is important in the model since it forms the 
ground on which commitment decisions are taken. It is assumed that 
knowledge of opportunities and problems should initiate decisions. Moreover, 
the choice between different alternatives is based on knowledge about the 
firm’s business environment and its performance of activities in it. 
 
Knowledge can be classified according to the way it was acquired. First, there 
is objective knowledge that can be taught and carried over from one person to 
another. Experiential knowledge on the other hand cannot be taught, only 
learned through personal experience. The second kind of knowledge is seen as 
crucial when enterprises internationalize and since it is more difficult to acquire 
than objective knowledge it is highly attractive. Thus, acquiring experiential 
knowledge in international operations becomes a key task. A company can only 
obtain the knowledge gradually through its operations. The less structured and 
well defined the activities and required knowledge is the more important 
experiential knowledge becomes. Therefore, activities that are connected to 
individuals such as managerial work or marketing necessitate experiential 
knowledge. 
 
In addition, experiential knowledge provides the ground for perceiving and 
formulating market opportunities. Objective knowledge can only be used to 
create theoretical propositions about future possibilities. However, experiential 
knowledge makes it possible to seize a real opportunity and to place it in the 
context of the present and future activities. 
 
A further classification of knowledge can be made into general knowledge and 
market-specific knowledge. General knowledge stands for knowledge that can 
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be applied in different markets such as marketing methods or characteristics of 
customers regardless of their geographical location. By contrast market-specific 
knowledge has to do with the awareness of special features of a single market 
where business climate, cultural patterns, structure of the market system and 
the characteristics of the customers distinguish one market from the others.  
 
A company needs both general and market-specific knowledge to drive 
operations in a foreign market. Market-specific knowledge is generally attained 
through experience. General knowledge on the other hand can be transferred 
from other markets and applied in any other market. This allows companies to 
take advantage of previously generated knowledge and utilize it in new 
situations. 
 
Current activities are the main method of gaining experience from a market, 
although a firm can also gain experience by hiring new personnel with the 
sought experience. Therefore, there is a need to differentiate between two kinds 
of experience, namely firm and market experience. A person requires both 
these types in order to be able to perform marketing activities and thus it is 
difficult to substitute company personnel who have firm experience with 
people from the outside who just have market experience. The more the 
activities are concentrated to production, the less interaction there is needed 
with the business environment and therefore it becomes easier to hire outsiders. 
The fact remains that experience from a market takes long time to acquire 
making the internationalization of companies a slow process. 
 
Another change aspect is the decision to commit resources to a foreign market. 
The decisions are dependent on which decision alternatives are available and 
how they were chosen. An assumption is made that firms choose their decision 
alternatives from the existing problems and opportunities concerning a market. 
These problems and opportunities are assumed to be dependent on experience. 
Therefore, the ones who hold responsibility for activities and deal with 
activities are the ones who encounter the decision situations. Problems and 
opportunities are by the ones dealing with them normally dealt with by 
extending the operations in the market i.e. taking a decision of further market 
commitment. 
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Two effects can be studied when additional market commitments are made, 
economic effect and market uncertainty. The economic effect refers to an 
increase of the size of the operations, whereas market uncertainty has to do 
with the decision-makers inability to predict the future outcomes generated by 
the market. Increasing interaction with the customers, setting up new service 
activities or buying customers can reduce the latter. 
 
Firms are expected to increase their commitment to a market as long as they 
reach the level of maximum market tolerable risk. Since the maximum tolerable 
level is highly dependent on the existing market uncertainty, a market 
commitment may arise from new experience generated by the activities in the 
market. This is the case if a market is stable. However, in highly unstable 
markets a company’s activities and experiences may not lead to any reduction 
of market uncertainty. In contrast, stable and homogenous markets do not 
demand experience to build the necessary market knowledge. Thus, these 
markets can be entered with the optimal mode from the very beginning. Market 
uncertainty can also fall due to a change in the competitive scenery or political 
stabilization of the business environment. Furthermore, a decision to increase 
the market commitment may rise from an increased tolerance towards market 
risk caused by a growth in the total amount of firm resources or as a result of a 
more aggressive approach with regard to risk. Companies that are expected to 
take decisions on considerable increases of resource commitment to a market 
will, therefore, either be firms with large resource endowments or those that 
perceive the market risk to be insignificant. 
 
Companies are also expected to do uncertainty-reducing commitments when 
the existing market risk situation is thought to be higher than the maximum 
tolerable level. Thus, a firm would try to increase its interaction and integrate 
with the market environment. 
 
In conclusion, commitment decisions are normally expected to result in a small 
step-wise increase in market commitment. The exceptions for this are when 
firms have very large resources, market conditions are stable and homogenous, 
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or when experience from similar markets has been attained and generalized on 
other markets. 
 
3.2 Market Entry Modes 
When a firm makes an investment in a new market it has a choice between a 
variety of market entry modes. The stages theory in the Uppsala-model gives a 
few examples of how a firm may internationalize by using a certain sequel of 
operation modes. However, Kotler (1997) proposes additional steps, especially 
in the exporting phase, that can be taken by companies when entering new 
markets. These are not directly connected to Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul’s 
theory about the establishment chain and thus do not constitute a theory. 
Rather, they should be seen as a complement of additional alternatives when 
operating on a foreign market. This section presents the most common market 
entry modes in business literature beginning with Kotler’s views and later 
complemented with Czinkota and Ronkainen (1998). 
 
3.2.1 Modes of Exporting 
In the initial phases of exporting when companies usually do not export by 
themselves, a company might take advantage of domestic-based export 
merchants, which are companies that buy goods form a manufacturer 
whereafter they are exported to foreign markets. A second category consists of 
domestic-based export agents. These companies look for clients with whom 
they negotiate foreign purchases.  If they succeed in finding a client they are 
paid commission. Trading companies are included in this category. 
Cooperative organizations export merchandise on behalf of a group of 
manufacturers. They are often under administrative control and are commonly 
used by producers of primary products.  
 
In a further stage of the exporting activities the manufacturer can take over its 
exporting activities and thus earn a higher profit since the intermediary is 
eliminated. Establishing a domestic-based export department or division is a 
way of dealing with foreign sales independently. Such a unit can carry out 
selling from the home base without being present on the target market. When a 
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company decides that that there is a need to be present in the foreign country 
and to have better control of the sales it might start up an overseas sales branch 
or subsidiary. This entry mode would enable the firm to handle sales and 
distribution locally. Furthermore, the firm could open up an own warehouse 
and perform promotion activities. Often sales subsidiaries in addition function 
as display centers or customer service centers. If there is no need for being 
present with a legal person the company could hire traveling export sales 
representatives who would take care of sales in the foreign country. 
 
3.2.2 Licensing 
Licensing is a relatively easy way for a company to enter a new market. The 
entry mode is based on a license, which gives a foreign company the right to 
use the manufacturing process, trademark, patent or trade secret of the firm 
interested in internationalizing. For the use of the license the licensee has to 
pay royalties. A major benefit of licensing is that it enables a firm to 
internationalize relatively easy without having to make any investments and at 
low risk. For the licensee this provides advantages in the sense that the 
company does not have to, for example, invent a new product. There are also 
disadvantages connected to licensing. For example, by granting a license a 
company reveals a part of itself, which is handed over to another party the firm 
has little or no control over. Furthermore, if the licensee is successful in taking 
advantage of the license the licensor has lost market opportunities that the 
company itself could have gained from. Three forms of licensing can be 
distinguished: management contracting, contract manufacturing and 
franchising. 
 
3.2.3 Joint Venture 
Czinkota and Ronkainen (1998) describe a joint venture as a form of 
cooperation between two or more parties for more than a transitory period. The 
partners share assets, risk and profits, although it does not have to be on an 
equal basis. In some joint ventures one partner is the main owner of the venture 
whereas in others the parties can hold an equal share. When a joint venture is 
launched the parties involved can contribute with several types of assets. For 
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example, a company can incorporate funds, technology, know-how, sales 
organizations or a plant and equipment. 
 
There are two reasons why companies prefer to establish a joint venture, 
governmental and commercial. Sometimes local governments for different 
reasons require that a firm wanting to enter the market must cooperate with 
local firms in the form of a joint venture. A usual demand is that at least a 
certain percentage of the joint venture should be owned by a domestic firm. A 
commercial motive to form a joint venture is that a firm might find a foreign 
partner with a common goal and if there would be no barriers to cooperating 
with that firm the joint venture would provide a very effective way of 
internationalizing. 
 
The strength of a joint venture lies in the possibility of taking advantage of 
each other’s advantages and thus being better off than if the parties tried to 
reach their goals individually. If the parties are specialized in different areas 
then the outcome is usually more effective. For example, if a firm wants to 
establish production in a foreign country and it has access to valuable 
technology but lacks capital it could find itself a strong capital partner to start 
production with. 
 
3.2.4 FDI and Full Ownership 
As stated by Kotler (1997) the highest possible form of market commitment is 
to fully own a manufacturing plant in a foreign country. This level can be 
reached either by making an acquisition of an existing manufacturer or by 
building own facilities from start i.e. making a green-field investment. 
 
Sometimes the decision to own the operations wholly is based on the thought 
that the firm should have total control over its business and avoid outsiders 
from interfering with management interests. In some cases the decision of full 
ownership can be based on a company principle, which is simply just followed. 
(Czinkota and Ronkainen, 1998) 
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The main disadvantage of having full ownership in a foreign production unit is 
that a company exposes itself to a large financial risk. In the case, for example, 
the foreign country’s currency is blocked or devaluated, the market worsens, 
assets are expropriated and the losses may turn substantial for the single owner. 
 
3.3 Industrial Networks 
According to Johanson and Mattsson (1988) an industrial system is composed 
of firms engaged in production, distribution and the use of goods as well as 
services. The term network is used to describe the existing relationships 
between the firms in such a system. Since there is a division of work between 
the actors they are considered to be dependent on each other’s resources and 
thus to make the networks function, co-ordination of activities is needed 
between the actors. The co-ordination does not take place through a central unit 
that decides the action plans nor through a price-mechanism. Instead work is 
co-coordinated through interaction between the actors involved in the network. 
Firms are free to decide which counterparts they want to interact and establish 
exchange relationships with. However, this freedom of choice is limited by the 
fact that it takes time and demands firm efforts to establish and develop the 
relationships. The co-ordination of the work is either managed by joint 
planning or the exercise of power of one party over another. Since networks 
include a multitude of firms this means that relationships have to be built with 
several actors including customers, distributors, suppliers and in a few cases 
even with the competitors. It might sometimes also be important to have 
relationships to third parties such as the customers of the customers or suppliers 
of the suppliers. 
 
Most of the exchange that occurs is in the framework of existing network 
relationships. However, starting new relationships and breaking old ones is part 
of a normal process. A reason for breaking up an existing relationship might, 
for example, be caused by competitive factors. A fact is that relationships are 
continually changing as a range of bonds is developed between the actors. A 
distinction can be made among technical, planning, knowledge, social, 
economic and legal bonds. 
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Due to competitive forces a firm’s relations to it its network counterparts are of 
interest for other companies who want to get access to the exchange relations. 
The reason why companies maintain their contacts is that there exists specific 
inter-firm dependence relations. A firm has direct dependence relations to the 
companies that are closest to it in the network and indirect dependence relations 
with actors that are closely connected to the nearest counterparts. 
 
When a company establishes itself on a new market it has to connect to a new 
network that is formerly unknown to it. This means that network relationships 
are built with new actors. In some cases this implies that old relationships have 
to be broken up. Of course the situation can be reversed when a previously 
unknown firm steps forward and establishes itself in a company’s network. 
 
The above reasoning suggests that a firm’s participation in a network is a 
cumulative process in which relationships are managed by building, developing 
or breaking them in order to reach economic well being, insure their survival 
and future development.  
 
The term market position is an important indicator of a firm’s power in a 
network. It refers to the firm’s relations to the counterparts i.e. to its industrial 
environment and is something that changes over time as a result of the firm’s 
past behavior. Furthermore, it lays the ground for the firm’s future development 
possibilities and constraints in the network. Thus, market position is of 
importance for strategic thinking in a company. Strategies are developed for the 
desired change and defense of the firm position. The explanation as to why 
market position is considered so important is that it allows a company to 
control the resources of other firms. Due to this a firm’s market position can be 
viewed as an intangible market asset as contrasted with internal assets that are 
directly controlled by the firm and used for production, marketing, 
development etc. 
 
There are by definition two different kinds of market positions, micro- and 
macro-positions. The first refers to the firm’s relation to an individual firm, 
whereas the latter describes the relation to the network as a whole or a specific 
part of it. There are three characteristics of a micro-position: 
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1. The role the firm has for the other firm 
2. Its importance to the other firm 
3. The strength of the relationship with the other firm 
 
A macro-position is on the other hand characterized by four factors: 
 
1. The identity of the other firms with which the firm has direct 
relationships and indirect relations in the network 
2. The role of the firm in the network 
3. The importance of the firm in the network 
4. The strength of the relationships with other firms 
 
When discussing the global industrial network it can be broke up and defined in 
smaller entities. The division of a network can be made in geographical areas, 
products, techniques etc. A ‘national net’ is a network within a nation’s border, 
whereas a ‘product net’ is one that refers to the group of firms that takes part in 
the production of a specific product or product area. Therefore, for example a 
‘heavy truck net’ comprises all the companies involved in production, 
distribution, repairing and the use of heavy trucks. The product area network 
can be further downsized to different geographically separated nets such as a 
German, Italian or Danish heavy truck net. 
 
3.3.1 Internationalization within Networks 
According to the network approach firm internationalization occurs when 
positions with actors in foreign networks are established and developed. There 
are three ways to do this. First, when a company establishes positions in 
relation to actors that are part of a new national net it has internationalized 
through international extension. A second way is to develop market positions 
and increase the commitment to a network in which the firm already has 
established a position. This alternative is called penetration. Third, there is 
international integration, which occurs when the co-ordination of positions 
between different national nets is increased. A common feature for all the three 
forms is that they make use of market positions. Therefore, investments in firm 
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internal and external assets, which are the building blocks of market positions, 
draw attention to themselves. 
 
3.4 The Network Model of the Firm Internationalization Process 
A common belief among scholars today is that theories concerning the firm 
internationalization process do not explain or do leave out certain important 
aspects in the attempt to enlighten the way a firm internationalizes. In present 
time, many firms internationalize very rapidly and the underlying explanation 
to this phenomenon is probably increased global competition and fast 
technological development. The models where firms internationalize in a slow 
step-by-step process are among several academics therefore considered to be 
outdated. Thus, Johanson and Vahlne (2002) propose that in order to increase 
our understanding of internationalization processes the Uppsala-model and the 
Network approach could be integrated into a wider theory, which they call the 
Network Model of the Firm Internationalization Process. 
 
The authors begin by stating that a common perception in international 
business literature is that individual country markets are separate entities and 
thus require different kinds of modes of operation. According to that concept 
economic, institutional and cultural barriers create the barriers to business. The 
terms psychic and cultural distance are factors that determine the size of the 
obstacles. Even if theses terms in academic work are mainly used to describe 
the differences between two country markets, psychic distance has in some 
papers been referred to as something that disturbs the relations between two 
companies i.e. an inter-firm distance.  Furthermore, experience has been seen 
as an influencing factor in this context (Hallén and Wiedersheim-Paul 1979; 
Nordström and Vahlne 1993).  
 
Entering markets is thus according to the prevailing process model a matter of 
climbing over the market barriers. This is managed by establishing the right 
mode of operations. In a network perspective the traditional thinking in terms 
of market entry modes as a way of overcoming barriers is not interesting since 
it is focused on building relationships with customers and suppliers. Therefore, 
the barriers in the network world consist of problems related to relationship 
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establishment and development. Some scholars believe that an 
internationalization process can be expected even in the network approach 
(Anderson and Weitz 1992; Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson and Johanson 1999). 
In this sense companies are thought to build their relations incrementally and 
again there should be an interplay between experiential knowledge 
development and resource commitment. The companies learn about each other 
by getting to know each other’s needs, resources, strategies and business 
conduct. The ground for such cooperation comes from mutual interest in a 
common development of resources. 
 
The authors refer to Håkansson and Johanson (2001) who state that there are 
three types of network learning. First, there is partner specific learning, which 
has to do with how the partner firm reacts in different situations, what the role 
of different employees is and the readiness of the partner firm to adapt in 
various ways. Thus, they learn about each other in a way that ties the two 
parties to each other and it is therefore also a further commitment to the 
relationship. 
 
A second type of learning occurs when firms learn something from their 
existing relationships that can be used in developing relations with other actors 
i.e. a sort of relationship experience development. Such experience is practical 
in particular when the firm wants to develop its relationships with companies 
that are similar, for example, companies that are of the same size use the same 
technology, have similar culture and institutional settings. 
 
Third, a result of interaction in a network is that the partner firms learn to 
coordinate other relationships with firms such as, for example, supplier 
relationships. Thus, the network is developed in the sense that relationships are 
connected to each other. 
 
The fourth network-learning situation emerges as a consequence of the three 
mentioned learning situations above. Dealing with network development makes 
companies more knowledgeable in this area and therefore it becomes easier for 
them to establish new networks in the future. 
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Based on these statements Johanson and Vahlne (2002) believe that a firm’s 
internationalization is the result of the firm’s development of existing 
relationships. It is expected that firms will establish foreign network relations 
with such firms that are similar to those the company is successfully 
cooperating with in the domestic network. Moreover, the internationalization of 
the firm will be a consequence of its development of relationships with 
customer firms that are connected to those, that they already are working 
together with. Thus, there is no pattern of internationalization offered by the 
network perspective as in the case of the Uppsala-model, since country markets 
are not seen as relevant entities i.e. the model does not say anything about what 
countries a firm will enter and expand in. Furthermore, the model does not 
foresee that a firm will follow the establishment chain. Therefore, the foreign 
market entry mode is not an issue that is emphasized in the network perspective 
to internationalization. Instead focus is on international expansion and network 
development. 
 
Commitments that are made to the relationships will primarily be incremental 
in character. Therefore, close interdependencies will be created to strategically 
important counterparts, which the company will constantly be ready to defend. 
This is going to be done through increasing the resource commitment to the 
partner relation and other firms that are important for the relation to the 
strategic partner. 
 
Studies in internationalization have shown that there are two kinds of market-
specific experience a company can benefit from, first, institutional experience 
and, second, business experience. Business experience is related to a firm’s 
knowledge about its business environment. In the network model the 
environment consists of a company’s relationships to the firms the company is 
engaged with. Institutional experience has to do with a company’s knowledge 
about a certain country’s language, laws, regulations and public and semi-
public authorities. Thus, it is the sort of experience that decreases the psychic 
distance to a country. Consequently, institutional experience and business 
experience focus on two different types of managerial problems, which means 
that there should be an interest in combining the network view with the 
internationalization process model. As a result, it could be said that there are 
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country-specific and cultural barriers (psychic distance) as well as 
relationship-specific barriers. Therefore, a distinction should also be made 
between country-specific and relationship-specific distance. 
 
3.5 The Eclectic Paradigm 
The Eclectic Paradigm is in this study used as a tool of classifying the findings 
of and analyzing the first research question of this study. The theory was 
chosen since it provides an easy and comprehensive way of analyzing why 
international production has been launched.  
 
In the 80s John Dunning created a theory that tried to explain when a firm is 
going to engage itself in international production. Previously, well-established 
theories had been created by Stephen Hymer and Raymond Vernon. However, 
their work on FDI theory and international production was not explaining the 
whole picture. Dunning’s thinking was new and he combined findings from 
various theoretical approaches such as the theory of the firm, organizational 
theory, trade theory and location theory. Thus, he came to call his theory the 
eclectic paradigm, which here is extracted from Dicken (1998). 
 
Dunning’s theory proposed that a company will start international production 
when all three conditions were fulfilled. First, there is ownership-specific 
advantage. Second, it would be required that the firm internalizes the 
advantage and, third, at least one so-called location specific factor would have 
to be existent. 
 
More specifically, ownership specific advantages can be seen as assets that are 
part of the firm. For example, it could be certain types of knowledge, 
organization, human skills, legally protected rights or commercial monopoly. 
Ownership-specific advantages can be created and purchased by the firm or 
arise from the firm’s size, diversity as well as technical characteristics. 
 
A firm might internalize an owner-specific advantage and start production 
abroad. This is not always the objective since it is also possible to establish a 
license agreement with a foreign firm or just to export products. However, what 
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will make a company internalize its advantage and start production over-seas is 
the fact that markets are imperfect, which will create economic opportunities 
for the company. As an example, a company could invest in production in a 
country where labor is cheaper since it would make good use of its ownership-
specific advantage. Another factor that drives internalization of advantages is 
uncertainty. The higher the level of uncertainty the better it is for the firm to 
internalize. Suppose that uncertainty is high regarding price or quality of 
supplies then a company might decide to internalize its knowledge about 
supplies production and integrate backwards. 
 
Location-specific factors include markets, resources, production costs, political 
conditions and cultural or linguistic affinities. In the case none of these factors 
offer better conditions abroad than in the home market a firm will not establish 
production overseas. 
 
3.6 Types of international production 
Production can be classified into two types according to Dicken (1998), 
market-oriented production and supply or cost-oriented production. Hence, 
these types show different purposes related to the foreign manufacturing, 
however, there is no clear boundary between the two of them, as there may 
seem to be. This classification of production is a good way of describing what 
an actor’s intention has been with its investment related establishment on a 
market and therefore it will provide a useful tool in answering the first research 
question of this study. 
 
Market-oriented production is established in a country for the purpose of 
serving the local geographical market. The goods that are produced may be 
identical to the ones that are produced elsewhere, although it is not unusual that 
a company decides to adapt manufacturing to local tastes or requirements. 
What makes a company take the decision to establish market-oriented 
production is most obviously market size. 
 
On the other hand, supply and cost-oriented production refers to firms that 
localize production in areas where they find attractive supplies to their 
 51
Theoretical Framework 
manufacturing that are highly localized geographically. Thus, this type of 
production concerns many firms active in natural resource industries. A key 
issue is what the firm’s cost structure is and how important a certain factor of 
production is. However, no matter how expensive a certain factor is, if the 
transportation cost is down at zero there is no need for a company to establish 
supply or cost-oriented production. 
 
Today many see the world’s most popular location-specific production factor 
as labor. The reasons why a firm might locate production in a foreign country 
due to the labor force, is because of geographical variations in wage costs and 
labor productivity. The labor cost issue is a highly significant element in 
international investment-location decisions. Furthermore, firms usually tend to 
establish production in countries where the labor controllability is high. 
 
3.7 FDI in Eastern Europe 
According to Domański (2000) there are significant differences in the character 
of FDI coming to Poland from various countries or regions of the world. He 
makes a distinction between market-oriented and cost-oriented investments and 
states that, contrary to popular belief, the majority of manufacturing FDI 
coming to Poland is aimed at serving the local market. This is particularly true 
of American and German investments out of which only a small portion is 
aimed at generating exports. However, Japanese investments generally diverge 
from this pattern since they are directed at taking advantage of the low costs 
associated with production and low labor costs in particular. Products 
manufactured at Japanese owned locations are to a very high degree exported to 
Western European markets. Swedish and Dutch enterprises have proved to be 
the most cost- and export-oriented out of all the European investors present in 
Poland. 
 
Kurz and Wittke (1998) bring these issues further by developing the reasons 
and strategies behind western enterprises’ presence in the Central and Eastern 
European economies and their expansion in the region. The authors mention 
that the opening up of the former planned economies means new market 
opportunities for foreign companies as well as new alternatives for 
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advantageous production location. The main motivation to place production in 
CEE and to use it as a supply base is to take advantage of the qualified, well 
trained and experienced industrial labor force, which is more cost competitive 
than the Western European. However, a question that demands attention is for 
how long the wage-levels in the currently most preferred countries Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic will remain low. 
 
Producing in these countries for the purpose of low labor costs is probably just 
a temporary strategy. In a medium to long-term perspective more and more 
western companies are believed to move production or parts of it further east to 
the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States where wage 
levels are lagging behind. Increasing direct investments by CEE countries to 
eastern neighbors suggests that the development has already begun. Although a 
key issue is how far east such an expansion could lead, since the advantage of 
spatial proximity to the many important western markets would diminish all 
along the process. 
 
The strong growth of the Eastern European markets makes them also attractive 
in terms of the existing and future output potential. For many companies this is 
the main determinant of locating production in the region. This is true in 
particular to producers of consumer goods (such as producers of foods and 
beverages, automobiles, consumer electronics and household appliances) who 
have mostly committed themselves to these markets by making investments in 
local production in those countries that have showed the highest per capita 
GDP. Kurz and Wittke (1998) distinguish between three types of production 
and distribution strategies followed by these actors. Two of them draw special 
attention, since they partly explain the motives for the increased business 
relationships between Poland and its eastern neighbors. Generally speaking, 
these two strategies pursued by some western firms aim at producing products 
in CEE adapted for the special requirements of these markets. The goal is to 
meet local needs by trying to match the products to the prevailing market 
conditions and consumption patterns. In addition, the objective is to try to reach 
the relatively similar markets further east of the CIS as well as developing 
country markets. 
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4 TRANSITION AND THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of what transition 
is and how it affects the business environment in the former Soviet block 
countries and the way foreign firms usually have to adapt to the prevailing 
circumstances. A distinction is made between networks and the economy or 
market as a business environment. 
4.1 The Concept of Transition 
Transition as a concept in the case of Central and Eastern Europe is defined by 
Mercado et al (2001) as “the movement away from a command to a market 
economy and to the creation of a new system for the generation and allocation 
of resources.” The definition indicates that the transformation process implies 
enormous reforms that can be related to various policies and institutions. These 
include market deregulation, price liberalization, privatization, enterprise 
restructuring as well as banking and financial sector reform. The transformation 
process in the CEE countries has also meant major changes as regards 
macroeconomic policies and foreign trade, which have been re-orientated to the 
west. However, as indicated in the introduction of this study trade relations 
with CEE and CIS member countries are increasing at least for Poland. 
 
The situation in the transition countries is worsened by the fact that even the 
most advanced countries in the region have difficulties understanding the 
mechanics and institutions that are part of a market-based economy. In 
addition, transition countries overall have several challenges regarding their 
financial, legal and institutional reform. 
 
The above description of transition is a broad economic one, which illustrates 
the changes taking place in the economic sphere. Another approach is taken by 
Nieminen (1999) who has analyzed and focused on the task environment, 
which is important for foreign firms operating in transition countries. He 
mentions that a lot of research has been done on the transitions economies, but 
few studies have been conducted about how the transformation process affects 
relations between Eastern European and Western firms. Thus, he discusses 
transition from the perspective of four changing processes: socio-political, 
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economic, institutional and individual and defines transition on the basis of the 
ongoing political changes, structural problems and insufficiencies in the 
institutional framework. 
 
Political change from socialist states to democracies is the most important 
characteristic of the transition process. Even though the changes started already 
in 1989 they have not yet come to an end and since the change processes began 
at different points of time in the single countries, they are all at different stages 
of development and no longer a homogenous group of countries.  A general 
trend shows that the countries where the Communist Party had ruled for a 
longer time, such as the CIS-countries, have more difficulties with the 
transition process than the countries of CEE. In an effort to improve their 
overall situation many of the newly independent states have started to re-
orientate politically towards the west. As a result, the Central European 
countries have applied for membership in the EU and some countries are 
already members of NATO. 
 
Major problems exist and have emerged from the lack of control over the 
market reforms. These include uncontrolled economic development with 
disturbances in it, shadow economy and criminal activity. Since democracy has 
basically not been fully implemented in many of the countries large economical 
inequalities have emerged and created several groups of people who have 
become losers in these economies. Furthermore, a wide spread political 
instability in foremost the CIS countries has meant that many firms do not want 
to commit themselves to these markets even if there can be good business 
opportunities. 
 
Macroeconomic changes play an important role in the transition countries, 
since major changes are needed to turn the command economy into a market 
economy. Liberalization and restructuring are two important aspects of this. A 
former command economy needs to liberalize, for example, prices or foreign 
trade and state-owned enterprises need to be privatized. Furthermore, firms and 
industries need to be restructured in order to be able to function in a market 
economy. Centrally planned economies were characterized by several factors 
that do not fit into a working market economy such as state monopoly on all 
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production, lack of customer orientation, competition, price controls, subsidies, 
production orientation, supply shortages and distribution by state enterprises. 
 
Production in the former Soviet block countries was to a large extent based on 
basic and heavy industries that generally speaking were highly inefficient. 
During the transition process, one of the most difficult hurdles to overcome has 
actually been the needed structural adjustment in the transition economies i.e. 
the move away from heavy industry towards services and smaller enterprises. 
 
In order for a functioning market economy to exist the society needs to build 
important infrastructure in the form of institutions that control the functioning 
of markets. In several countries of the Eastern European region many important 
institutions such as legal institutions, enforcement mechanisms, banking 
services, tax administration and public administration are still largely 
unreformed and at an early stage of development. For example, the legal and 
regulatory environment may many times be inconsistent and contradictory, 
which creates confusion among firms operating in such markets. 
 
After the communist government institutions active in the planned economy 
were liquidated, the economies of the transition countries started to develop in 
an uncontrolled way. The reason was that the new systems were incapable of 
introducing a new institutional system at once. Instead it was realized that the 
process was going to a take long time. As a result of the institutional lack, 
production decreased since the government who had been the largest customer 
for the majority of enterprises ceased to buy. This development also gave birth 
to shadow economy and criminal activity in business life. In addition, due to 
the large shadow economy the quality of the statistics in transition countries is 
often poor, which means that it is very difficult for companies to analyze the 
past or to predict the future development. 
 
Other major problems hindering the development of market economy can be 
associated with weak banking sectors as well as transportation and distribution 
systems. In general, what can be seen is that there is no basic trust for 
institutions or the society in these countries. 
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Another major change factor has been behavioral change, which takes place in 
the social and cultural setting. Since it is the policy-makers, enterprise 
managers and individual citizens who carry out the transition process it is their 
ability to adapt to a new environment that is a key determinant of success in the 
process. As mentioned large parts of the populations of the transition 
economies have had to suffer from poverty, insecurity and inequality and 
therefore there is broad skepticism among them towards the transition changes.  
 
Both managers and individuals in these countries need education about the new 
system. Foreign companies have played an important role by educating their 
employees. In broad terms, people have had to start thinking in individualistic 
terms instead of collectivistic, which has implied accepting income inequalities 
and lower governmental social aid. It has been realized that this is a long-term 
change process where the values, habits and attitudes of individuals change 
gradually. 
 
4.2 The Network as a Business Environment 
Looking at the business environment in transition countries as a network 
Nieminen (1999) reveals what implications the transition process has on 
business network relationships. The author mentions first that firms operating 
in Eastern Europe have gotten an increased autonomy since the end of 
communism. This means that they now are able to take decisions more 
independently on how to run the company and whom to build contacts with.  
 
However, there are several factors that limit their business possibilities. The 
previously state run companies do not have experience or knowledge about 
doing business in a competitive environment. They also often do not possess 
competitive products nor do they have adequate financial resources. What 
further complicates their situation and the situation for foreign companies as 
well is the underdeveloped infrastructure, high taxes and political plus 
economic instability. Due to these reasons there are a lot of Eastern European 
firms ready to get in contact with western companies in order to increase their 
financial resources and technological or managerial knowledge. Major failures 
that have been noted as western firms have tried to build relationships with 
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Eastern European firms emerge from low commitment, conflicting objectives 
for co-operation and the pursuit of short-term profits. 
 
Networks are considered to be highly important for western firms operating in 
transition countries. The situation has changed since the fall of communism and 
today network relationships are mainly built with independent companies 
without the interference of government authorities or monopolies, as the case 
was not so long ago. 
 
 
Figure 4 - The Evolution of Business Networks in Eastern Europe from the Command 
Economy Era up to Present 
Source: Nieminen (1999) 
 
The character of the network counterparts in Eastern Europe varies from the 
traditional relationships in the west. Not only the buyer-seller relationships are 
considered important, but also relationships with other actors in the 
environment such as distributors, suppliers, managers of other foreign 
companies on the market, local employees, politicians, bankers, government 
and municipal organizations etc. Especially, firms with little experience have 
shown to gain substantially from creating large networks. 
 
The reason why the additional relationships are important is that they 
complement the insufficiencies experienced in the transition markets. A further 
aspect of this matter is related to the fact that personal contacts have come to 
play a significant role in diminishing uncertainty and risk. Good relationships 
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with important persons can help a company to overcome problems related to, 
for example, uncharted legislation or institutional inefficiencies. Thus, firms 
seek security through personal relationships when the institutional framework 
cannot guarantee it. Moreover, good personal relationships seem to be more of 
a prerequisite for doing business in transition markets rather than an outcome 
of business activities as it normally is in the west. 
 
Since the business environment in transition economies is highly dynamic, the 
roles of different relationships change and therefore it is important for foreign 
firms to develop several meaningful relationships instead of just focusing on a 
single relationship. Furthermore, it is important for foreign firms to create 
relationships with those actors that have strong positions in local networks. 
Thus, managing different relationships becomes a key issue. 
 
The opening up of the former command economies has broadened the scope of 
operation modes that can be used. As result inter-firm cooperation has 
increased today popular operation modes are equity joint ventures, acquisitions 
and subcontracting deals. In addition, since 1990 foreign firms have been able 
to establish wholly owned subsidiaries throughout Eastern Europe. Due to 
various levels of perceived operating risks certain operating modes are more 
common in some countries. In countries that have been more successful in their 
transformation such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia high 
commitment operating modes are more common. In contrast, the operation 
modes that are used in the CIS countries tend to be more of low commitment 
character, for example, using local sales subsidiaries or forming joint ventures 
in the effort to minimize risk. 
 
4.3 The Ukrainian Economy as a Business Environment 
According to the World Markets Research Center (2002) Ukraine gained its 
dependence and broke out of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the first years 
on the path to democracy little liberalization of the political situation incurred. 
The country was led by nationalists and communists who used the situation to 
secure privileges and control of the country’s assets. Policies remained largely 
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unchanged and the economic situation worsened, which led to hyperinflation 
and recession. 
 
In 1994, the first truly democratic presidential elections were held and the 
former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma became president. He promised 
desperately needed economic reforms and renewal of the political as well as 
economic ties with Russia. As Kuchma was reelected in 1999 a battle with his 
opponents in the country’s parliament resulted in a referendum, which 
proposed a reduction of the parliament’s political power. A suspiciously high 
majority of the voters, 80-90 percent, approved the constitutional changes that 
had been put forward. As the changes were basically undemocratic in their 
nature there was a fear that Kuchma pursued the same type of leadership as his 
Belorussian counterpart Lukashenko. However, the suggested political reforms 
have until today remained unrealized. 
 
In 2000, the country’s political stability was shaken by accusations that 
Kuchma was directly involved in the disappearance of an oppositional 
journalist. Moreover, the whole presidential administration was accused of a 
list of crimes and corruption, which led to sporadic mass demonstrations in the 
country. This culminated in a dismissal of the government by a parliamentary 
vote of ‘no confidence’ in April 2001 and is considered to be the largest 
political crisis since the country’s independence. 
 
After almost a decade of economic contraction the Ukrainian economy has 
made good progress since the turning point in 2000, one year after the Russian 
crisis. In 2001, GDP grew by 9,1 percent, which can be considered a very high 
growth figure. However, growth is expected to stagnate during the next few 
years. Overall GDP was in 2001 37,6 billion USD, which in per capita terms 
compared to the United States is only 2,1 percent. 
 
Recent fiscal and monetary progress has been successful. However, now 
attention is drawn into achieving further structural reforms. An important part 
of this will be the restructuring of the country’s state-controlled banking sector. 
Even if overall privatization has been realized to a certain extent Ukraine is still 
far behind as regards privatization reforms. Many foreign investors have 
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avoided making investments in Ukraine due to the continually changing 
privatization rules, although the government tries to attract foreign investors 
into the country and has given the issue priority. In 1996, a law was passed that 
guarantees registered foreign firms equal treatment with local companies. 
 
The legal situation in Ukraine has remained uncertain. Generally speaking the 
problem is that some parts of the law have not been improved, whereas some 
legislative areas change very fast and create an unmanageable legal system. 
The country needs a more predictable legal environment, especially since 
Ukraine is one of the former Soviet republics that managed the transition of the 
legal system less smoothly. 
 
As a heritage from the Soviet days Ukraine carries a heavy baggage of 
troublesome bureaucracy, which is expected to remain for a long time. This 
problem has been addressed by the government, but results have been poor 
since corruption and rent-seeking networks reach high up in the administrative 
sphere. Actually, corruption is a widespread problem in Ukraine in particular 
due to the changing regulatory environment. The most common form of it is 
low-level corruption, which includes bribes and “gifts.” 
 
Even if a deep investigation into the Ukrainian market situation is not made 
here, the above description shows some market characteristics that are typical 
for Ukraine and also largely to the majority of at least CIS-economies. As 
explained in the introduction of the thesis there is no need for a deeper 
environmental study of Ukraine since the focus lies on the foreign subsidiaries’ 
perceptions and experiences of the country. Hence, this section had only the 
purpose to illuminate some important issues in Ukraine for the purpose of 
increasing the reader’s understanding. 
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5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The following chapter represents a summary of material that was collected 
during a two-week field study in Poland. During this time representatives of 
seven subsidiaries owned by multinational corporations were interviewed 
regarding their expansion to and operations in Ukraine as well as Poland. 
Four of these companies have at some point of time established production in 
Ukraine. The remaining three have solely been exporting. Each case begins 
with a short description of the group and the subsidiary, which is followed by 
the expansion process first to Poland and secondly to Ukraine. 
5.1 Can-Pack Group 
The interview about Can-Pack was conducted with Mr. Rafał Gaczorek, Sales 
Manager, at the head office in Krakow on 30 October 2002. The interview was 
later complemented by a telephone interview with Mr Olszewski who is a 
regional manger and in charge of the operations in Ukraine. 
 
5.1.1 Introductory Company Overview 
Can-Pack is a wholly owned subsidiary belonging to the American group F & P 
Holding, which is mainly engaged in the packaging and foods business. The 
group employs approximately 2000 people in Poland and is one of Europe’s 
largest producers of metal cans, the largest in Eastern Europe. The company 
offers a wide range of products that includes cans for foods, chemicals and 
beverages as well as capsules for bottles and plastic PET-bottles. Moreover, the 
company provides technical services to their clients, which aim at helping the 
customer in several ways in case they have problems with their product lines. 
 
Can-Pack has established production facilities in Poland. Today there are five 
factories in country that produce metal packages. In the remaining CEE-
countries there is one factory in the Ukraine, Russia and Romania respectively. 
In addition, a factory has been established in the United Arab Emirates. Sales 
offices have been opened in Russia and Hungary. Their objective is to conduct 
market analyses and to take care of the incoming goods that are aimed for sales. 
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Moreover, the subsidiary sells its products in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Moldavia, in the countries of former Yugoslavia, Estonia and Latvia. 
 
5.1.2 Entry into Poland 
The parent company F & P Holding is situated in the U.S. where several 
production facilities for industrial packaging of different kinds are run. The 
initial investments in Poland where made by the mother company with the 
beginning in 1989 as a state-owned manufacturing facility was acquired and the 
company Pol-Am-Pack S.A was established. This was followed by the creation 
of several new companies that became part of the group. The motive for the 
investments was that Poland was seen as a very interesting and attractive 
market due to its growing packaging industry and its future market potential. 
Furthermore, it was seen as a stable market in comparison to other countries in 
the region. Worth to note is that Poland was the first European country that was 
entered by F & P Holding. Later, decisions were taken to enter other markets in 
the region. Due to this development the Polish unit has become the regional 
base of the enterprise. It controls and is responsible for all the other markets in 
CEE and CIS. 
 
The Polish market became interesting for F & P Holding after the political 
turnaround in 1989. The market was entered through acquiring existing 
producers of packaging companies that were state-owned. Technology was 
transferred and capital was invested in the facilities that raised overall capacity 
of production to an acceptable level. Before the entry into Poland F & P 
Holding had already internationalized and ran operations on most continents. 
 
At first the operations in Poland were aimed at satisfying the polish market. 
The main tasks were to try to understand the Polish customers’ needs and to 
adapt machines and technology to local needs. Later on, Can-Pack started to 
expand its activities and new types of packages were introduced to the market. 
 
In the planning phase the existing market conditions in Poland were still 
relatively unknown since there was no experience from the market. It was also 
unsure what was going happen in Poland after the political changes that had 
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taken place. Therefore, initially there were no concrete plans of expanding the 
subsidiary’s business into other countries. It was to be seen how the market was 
going to develop in the future and first then decisions could be made about 
further expansion. 
 
5.1.3 Entry into Ukraine 
After having launched production in Poland interest grew about the 
possibilities to export to the neighboring countries. The countries that the 
polish unit started to export to first were Ukraine, Russia, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. The unit also exported to Scandinavia. A key figure for Can-Pack 
is that exports pay off maximally 1000-1100 km from the point of production. 
Further away transport costs are expected to rise too high. Naturally, the closest 
neighbor countries fell within these limits. 
 
The Ukrainian packaging market was perceived as poorly developed and with a 
population of about 50 million it was seen as a large market. With many of the 
domestic packaging firms producing and exporting to Russia it was supposed 
that there was a lack or a need for high quality packages to reasonable prices. 
Subsequently, people from the Polish unit were sent to Ukraine to visit 
potential clients with the purpose to analyze the market needs and to find new 
clients for the subsidiary. In this way the market was scanned for its sales 
potential, what packaging needs there were, what the clients demanded, the 
general price level and what possibilities there were for cooperation with 
Ukrainian businesses. The actions were fruitful and in the middle of the 
nineties the first business deals were successfully closed with Ukrainian 
counterparts, which lead to the first exports from Poland to Ukraine. 
 
Every country has its own standards when it comes to packages. This meant 
that Can-Pack had to adapt its production lines, materials, components etc to 
the prevailing conditions in Ukraine. Such market adaptations are common 
since they are practically made for every new market. They always cause 
additional costs for the subsidiary, but enable the subsidiary to sell its products 
on new markets. In the beginning only a few product types were sold and 
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exported to Ukraine. As the market developed new products were added to the 
assortment. 
 
Over time exports started to grow as the market developed. Many potential 
clients increased their capabilities and quality of production, which meant that 
they needed higher quality supplies. The domestic suppliers were not able to 
meet the higher standards and therefore domestic producers started more and 
more to turn themselves to foreign suppliers. A factor that slowed down the 
process was the price of Can-Pack’s products, which has all the time been in 
the premium range due to the quality level that has to be fulfilled by the 
subsidiary as it follows the ISO-standards. Ukrainian customers prefer lower 
quality. However, Can-Pack has not been able to satisfy this price segment 
since it is impossible for them to lower the quality level. 
 
Not long after exports had been launched a sales office was opened in Kiev, the 
capital of Ukraine. Its purpose was to import goods from Poland so that it 
would be possible to sell them to Ukrainian clients in the country’s own 
currency in contrary to the previous situation where the client needed to pay for 
his imports in USD. The sales office was also supposed to eliminate the clients 
need to declare imported goods. Can-Pack has tried not to use any agents since 
they demand provision and therefore it is seen as more profitable to sell 
independently. 
 
Can-Pack has since the beginning of the export activities been aware about the 
general financial situation of companies in Ukraine, not the least through its 
own market analyses on the field and awareness of situations where foreign 
parties selling to Ukrainian counterparts have been left without payment. 
Moreover, it is believed that Ukrainian firms usually emerge as fast as they 
disappear. Thus, Ukrainian counterparts are generally perceived as unreliable 
and thus difficult to do business with. Therefore, the subsidiary has always 
secured itself financially against possible insolvency of Ukrainian customers by 
demanding payment in advance or by using bank guarantees. The ambition has 
always been to secure all exporting activities maximally. As a part of this 
practice Can-Pack has taken advantage of the Polish Export Credit Insurance 
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Corporation, which provides insurances and guarantees for exporting 
companies. 
 
With growing exports and the increasing knowledge about the market, Ukraine 
became the second country in Europe where a production unit was established. 
This was done through acquisition of a majority stake in a Ukrainian 
manufacturer, approximately two years after the exports had started. Today the 
factory employs approximately 22 persons. The reason why Can-Pack decided 
to acquire a share of an existing producer and to establish a joint venture was 
partly because of the general perception that East Europeans prefer do business 
with domestic firms instead of foreign companies, since they are loyal towards 
their own market. Having majority control allowed Can-Pack to decide over 
important strategic issues alone without having to deal with ownership interest 
conflicts and that is why the Polish subsidiary has not had any problems 
regarding decision taking or operations. 
 
During the time of the investment there was an underdeveloped domestic 
supply of crown caps for bottles in Ukraine and therefore the decision was to 
start supplying that segment with local production. The foodstuff packages 
market was more saturated since all the large manufacturers of packaged foods 
were producing and satisfying their own needs. Thus, it was difficult to sell to 
them especially since the most important factor for them was price. The smaller 
foods producers did either buy from the larger ones or organize their supplies 
from other actors. 
 
Additional reasons why production was launched was that the investment 
possibilities in Ukraine were considered to be attractive since the subsidiary 
had the possibility to make the investment in an economic zone and because the 
government of that time was seen as investment-friendly. Furthermore, the 
investment was made in Lviv, which is situated in western Ukraine close to the 
Polish border and thus within a relatively short distance (250 km) from Can-
Pack’s production facilities in Brzesko and the head office in Krakow. This 
allowed Can-Pack to establish the operations in the fastest and most preferable 
way as well as decrease costs associated with transportation and customs 
duties. The region around Lviv was in addition considered to have the most 
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developed packaging market. When considering other Eastern European 
markets Russia as well as Belarus were perceived as less developed markets. 
Belarus had also the disadvantage of not being politically ready for direct 
investment. 
 
The investments in Ukraine were partly made by Can-Pack in Poland and 
partly by the American owner who also conducted market analyses on Ukraine 
and calculated on its return on investment capacity. As the operations at the 
Ukrainian plant began Can-Pack had transferred good but used machines from 
its factories in Poland to the Ukrainian manufacturing site. There was also a 
transfer of personnel who knew and applied the Polish production practice in 
the newly bought factory. This made it possible to reach the same production 
quality as the one in Poland. The parent company was not part of the operative 
process. 
 
The facility came to specialize in the production of crown caps since this was 
the largest and most promising market segment in Ukraine from Can-Pack’s 
perspective, however, only one product category of Can-Packs product range. 
The market for the other products was not seen as profitable enough to get a 
reasonable return on investment even if the market itself was large. 
 
The manufacturing was first of all adapted to local product standards, since 
sales of the output were planned for the Ukrainian market. At a later stage the 
plant started to manufacture crown caps for clients in Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, there has been no export to Poland, 
since the production of crown caps there remained. Still today the main market 
for the products produced outside of Lviv is Ukraine. 
 
Today, there are still Polish exports going to the Ukrainian clients. However, 
they are limited since the production unit has been established there, which 
satisfactorily supplies the market. The products that are exported from Poland 
are those that are not produced locally by the Ukrainian producer i.e. mainly 
foodstuff packages in the form of cans. 
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5.1.4 Future Development and Expansion 
Today’s exports to above all Russia but also Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan might 
in the future lead to further investments to those countries. In fact, Can-Pack 
already has plans and intends to make investments in Russia in the near future 
in order to establish a production of cans. When it comes to the Asian markets 
of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they are today considered not to hold enough 
market potential or being enough developed. The countries have large 
populations, but they are generally economically poor. 
 
Many of the barriers that restrain Can-Pack from increasing its activities in 
Ukraine are the same today as they were some years ago. First of all, the 
Ukrainian customers’ preferences towards low-priced goods, that Can-Pack is 
unable to produce. Quality is a factor that does not get much attention. 
Furthermore, Can-Pack sells not just a core product, but also services that are 
not demanded by the Ukrainian clients. Second, the weak financial situation of 
Ukrainian firms does not allow closer cooperation, since they in many cases are 
unable to pay for their purchases. Although as the market is still developing it 
needs some time. If the situation was different, for example the financial 
situation of Ukrainian firms were better, Can-Pack could of course sell more to 
the market. The subsidiary’s way of approaching potential customers and 
demanding securities for the business deal to be closed limits the amount of 
companies that the subsidiary can do business with. 
 
In order for Can-Pack to make any further investments in Ukraine the market 
has to develop and reach a certain economic level, which can guarantee 
stability and possibility of predicting the future. The companies that are weak 
have to disappear form the market and leave the ones that are financially strong 
and need quality products. Moreover, there has to appear a reliable financial 
institution that can verify a company’s financial health. 
 
The manufacturing plant outside Lviv imports its inputs used in the production 
from Poland due to the fact that the quality level provided by Ukrainian 
suppliers is experienced as too poor. 
 
 69
Empirical Findings 
5.2 Delphi Automotive Systems Poland 
The material to case of Delphi Poland was collected during an interview with 
Mr. Krzysztof Frelek on 24 October 2002 in Warsaw. Mr Frelek is responsible 
for the subsidiary’s exports to Ukraine. 
 
5.2.1 Introductory Company Overview 
Delphi is part of the automotive industry as a supplier of automotive parts and 
components. The product range is very broad and includes electric and 
mechanical systems, a variety of elements in cars that are made of glass or 
rubber as well as shock absorbers, car oil etc. In general terms Delphi’s 
business can be divided into two broad segments; supplies to vehicle producers 
and a business called aftermarket, which refers to replacement products. The 
larger and more important segment is the vehicle producer supplies, which 
accounts for around 90 per cent of total business. The market size of the 
products that Delphi produces is dependent of the amount of cars in use in a 
country. Therefore, the largest market in the world for automotive parts is the 
United States. In Europe, Germany and France are the top markets. The 
turnaround of the whole group at present is roughly 26 billion USD, which 
makes Delphi the largest player in its industry. Its biggest competitor is Bosch. 
Totally, the company employs 230 000 people worldwide out of which 5500 
are working in Poland. The yearly sales in Poland amount up to 250 million 
USD. 
 
Before the company entered Eastern Europe it had a strong presence in western 
parts of the continent as well as on most of the other continents. Today, Delphi 
has established production facilities in the following Eastern European 
countries: Poland, Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Romania. In addition two sales subsidiaries have been opened up, one in 
Poland and the other one in Russia. All other Eastern European countries are 
served by direct exporting. 
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5.2.2 Entry into Poland 
Delphi’s activities in Poland where in the beginning only associated with 
exporting from western markets. The Polish market was further penetrated in 
1995 as a manufacturing plant was acquired. The motive was that Delphi was 
looking for a new production base that could help the company to become more 
competitive. The production that was launched was a labor intensive one, since 
the company wanted to take advantage of the low labor costs. Poland was also 
seen as an interesting market because there were several automobile producers 
in the country. Also, at that time Opel made an investment in Poland and since 
General Motors owned both Delphi and Opel this provided a motive to make an 
investment. However, it was not the main reason behind Delphi’s entry into the 
country. Furthermore, Poland was also considered to be a country with a lower 
operating risk than other countries in the region. At present, there are six 
factories operating in Poland. 
 
The Polish unit is responsible for the aftermarket activities in Russia even 
though the Russian market was the first market entered by Delphi in the whole 
of Eastern Europe. However, when it comes to the remaining activities of the 
company the Russian unit reports to the European headquarters, which is 
situated in Paris. 
 
Otherwise, Poland is responsible for exporting replacement products to all the 
markets east of the country. The reason for this is that the Polish organization 
has grown much faster and become a whole lot larger than, for example, the 
Russian or any other Easter European unit. At present, there is only one factory 
in Russia, whereas there have been several factories established in Poland. All 
the Polish manufacturing plants are wholly owned by Delphi except for one, 
which has been established as a joint venture where the joint owner is the 
Polish state with a share of 25 per cent. The Central European markets to the 
south of Poland, such as Hungary, are more tied to the Austrian division. 
 
The subsidiary owns several warehouses from where products are shipped to 
Ukraine to be sold to local customers. Today, around 70 per cent of the total 
turnover created by the Polish unit is generated by exports, whereas the 
remaining 30 per cent is sold in the home market. 
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5.2.3 Entry into Ukraine 
As a sales office was opened in Russia in the early nineties it became obvious 
that the unit could also export to Ukraine as well as to other former Soviet 
states. Thus, the initiative to establish sales in Ukraine was initially taken by 
the Russian unit. The reason behind Delphi’s interest in Ukraine was purely 
tied to the output potential of that market in terms of aftermarket sales. 
Generally speaking, Delphi tries to extend its aftermarket operations to every 
possible country where there is a potential market. Already from the very 
beginning of the export activities in 1996 Delphi Russia started cooperating 
with a local distributor, which ever since has been the single Ukrainian 
distributor used by the subsidiary. Delphi chose to work with the client due to 
its good potential on the market and since it was is easy to work with just one 
partner. The distributor is active in the replacement products business and sells 
also the competitors’ products. Its headquarters are in Kiev and it controls a 
distribution network of 60 subsidiaries that cover the whole of Ukraine. To use 
a local distributor in order to reach the final customers in Ukraine was a natural 
move, since this is the norm in the industry. Producers such as Delphi do 
normally not sell directly to the end users in the aftermarket. In the case of its 
current distributor Delphi sells its products ex-works meaning that the 
distributor is responsible for the merchandise after it leaves the factory. 
 
A few years later Delphi Poland took over the exporting activities and supply 
of the Ukrainian market. There has been no sense in increasing the amount of 
Ukrainian distributors because the cooperation has functioned without any 
disturbances and the Ukrainian representative has satisfied the subsidiary with 
a steady sales growth over the years. Each year a new contract on cooperation 
is signed between the two parties. Moreover, Delphi has chosen this form of 
entry since it is associated with a very low financial risk as well as costs. Most 
of Delphi’s competitors are active in Ukraine. However, it is generally not 
considered to be a priority market. The country has a large population, but 
since the income level is low the market potential is small. A more important 
market for Delphi today is Russia. 
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The knowledge about the Ukrainian market is limited due to that only a small 
amount of information reaches the Polish unit. It is natural that when Delphi is 
not independently present on the market the knowledge about it is lesser. 
However, there is a continuous communication between the Polish unit and its 
Ukrainian distributor. As an example they meet almost once every month. At 
present, there is no need to increase the level of cooperation or increasing the 
costs for that relationship. 
 
A further reason why Delphi has not committed itself more to the Ukrainian 
market is that the market is perceived to hold a high level of political and 
financial risk. The subsidiary can simply not know what is going to happen on 
the Ukrainian market. In addition, Delphi has also had bad experiences on the 
Russian market for quite a long time. Since the Russian crisis broke out the 
company’s business in Russia has gone through difficult times, as a lot of 
customers suddenly were unable to pay or buy anything at all. A similar event 
could affect an eventual investment in Ukraine. Therefore, Delphi prefers to 
remain cautious at least as long as the rate of return does not cover the high 
risk. 
 
Exports from Poland are also managed through two so-called export houses. 
Both of them are relatively small Polish companies that have entered the 
Ukrainian market and established local distribution channels. Delphi got in 
contact with these companies in connection with the acquisition of a factory in 
Poland in 1997. They had already worked as distributors for the previous owner 
of the plant and maintained their role after the acquisition i.e. they buy directly 
from Delphi in Poland and export to their Ukrainian clients via their sales 
channels. These companies have no right selling Delphi’s products neither in 
Poland nor to any other country besides Ukraine. However, their sales of 
Delphi’s total exports is minor, since they concentrate only in the sales of parts 
and accessories for the Soviet car brand Lada. 
 
Delphi has not established any supplier relationships in Ukraine mainly 
because Ukrainian suppliers are not bound to any quality systems. 
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5.2.4 Future Development and Expansion 
The Ukrainian market is still today seen as a high-risk country. The risks arise 
from political and economic uncertainty, which means that Delphi has little 
interest in investing in the country at all. The case is not that Delphi does not 
want to invest in Ukraine, but that the return on investment has to be higher in a 
country, which has a higher risk level. This is not the case today. 
 
The Ukrainian market is expected to remain more or less the same over the next 
few years under the circumstance that no major changes occur that would 
change the situation. However, any major positive changes are perceived as 
highly unlikely. The living standards are still too low with the exception of 
large cities. 
 
A characteristic of Delphi is that they normally establish production facilities in 
closeness to global automotive manufacturers. In Ukraine the company has no 
clients of such kind. Regarding the aftermarket business there are no cases 
where a production unit is launched just for the purpose of serving clients with 
replacement products in one market. Thus, a potential investment by Delphi in 
Ukraine is dependent on whether a major car manufacturer enters the Ukrainian 
market. If there is no such entry, Delphi will not make any investment in 
Ukraine either, because otherwise the market does not contain any clients worth 
producing for. 
 
But if there is a product category, which is in the low price segment and that 
would need cheaper production to be more price competitive there is a chance 
that Delphi could make an investment just for the purpose of taking advantage 
of cheap labor. Yet today, the margins in the automotive industry are on such a 
level that an investment in this sense is not needed. 
 
The most realistic further commitment in the near future is to establish an own 
distribution network. However, there are still a lot problems associated with the 
declaration of goods and the border control, which complicates the exporting 
activity. In the case Delphi would establish its own distribution network in 
Ukraine it would from that moment on have to deal with the customs by itself. 
Today, the Ukrainian distributor manages the cross-border trade and is 
 74 
 
Chapter V 
therefore used to the appropriate behavior and special procedures. Delphi has 
no possibility to engage in illegal activities and has therefore no experience of 
such conduct. They know, however, that conducting business activities in 
Ukraine in many cases requires some sweetening. Thus, there is little incentive 
for Delphi to start managing the exports independently. 
 
In the case an investment would be made in Ukraine the responsibility of the 
operations would most likely be placed with the Polish unit, if the investment 
concerned the aftermarket business. On the other hand, if the investment were 
in a manufacturing plant that would function as a supplier for an automotive 
producer the responsibility would probably be given to another organization 
depending on what products or division it would concern. 
 
5.3 Esselte Poland 
The background information to Esselte Poland’s entry into Ukraine was 
collected during an interview with Mrs. Agnieszka Strzelczyk who works under 
the sales president for Poland and is specifically appointed for Ukraine and 
Belarus. The meeting took place on 5 November 2002. 
 
5.3.1 Introductory Company Overview 
Esselte is one of the largest global office supplies manufacturers, which means 
that the company produces and sells products such as file folders, plastic 
pockets, staplers etc. The company was established in the beginning of the 
twentieth century and is originally from Sweden. It has a strong international 
presence through its 25 subsidiaries around the world and sales in over 120 
countries (www.esselte.com, 2002). 6500 people are globally employed in the 
company and its yearly turnover is around 1.1 billion USD. In Poland, Esselte 
has sales of approximately 19 million USD and employs circa 600 people. In 
Eastern Europe Esselte has today sales offices in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Russia and production only in Poland and Hungary. Other Eastern 
European countries are supplied by direct exports. Since July 2002, Esselte is 
owned by J.W Childs Associates, which is an American private equity 
investment firm that has acquired the group. 
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5.3.2 Entry into Poland 
Esselte established production in Poland in 1991. The factory, which was 
opened in a small town called Korzienice 150 km south east of Warsaw, started 
to produce a sort of file folders that is the main standard in Sweden. Thus, all 
the products that came out of the factory were exported to Sweden. At that time 
the production site employed 25 people. The intention of the firm was to take 
advantage of the cheap labor in Poland. Before the production plant had been 
established Polish customers had been importing Esselte’s products from 
Germany to a certain extent. Therefore, the management was aware that there 
was a market in Poland 
 
In 1992, the Swedish management took the decision to open a sales office in 
Poland, since the Polish economy was expanding. The mission of the sales 
office was to build up a distribution network by looking up wholesalers and 
larger companies who could start selling Esselte’s products within Poland. 
From that point of time, the factory in Korzenice started to adapt and produce 
products for the growing Polish market. 
 
The expansion in Poland was relatively fast and sales increased from year to 
year. Today the factory in Korzienice is Esselte’s largest factory in Europe with 
36 000 square meters, a huge warehouse and 560 employees. Production has 
been modernized and is today highly automated. The factory has also become a 
logistics center for Europe due to its size and the large variety of products that 
are produced. Approximately 750 product categories are manufactured and then 
sold all over Europe. However, not all products in Esselte’s portfolio are sold 
and therefore the subsidiary imports certain items from other countries for its 
Polish customers. The sales office is in Warsaw where 32 people are employed 
within marketing, sales and finance. The company’s products are distributed 
through 80-100 independent distributors around the whole of Poland. 
 
Esselte as a group is organized in a way where countries that have sales units 
are responsible for markets that have no representation. In 1998, the Polish 
Esselte unit was given the responsibility for Belarus and the Ukrainian market. 
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Before the changes France had been responsible for the two markets. Another 
example in Central Europe is the Czech unit, which was given control over 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
For the group the changes meant that above all transportation costs were 
lowered significantly now that the Polish unit was supplying the two markets 
instead of the French. Furthermore, it was more economic to sell goods coming 
from the Polish factory since they were produced at a lower cost. 
 
5.3.3 Entry into Ukraine 
Esselte started to export to Ukraine through its French subsidiary in the early 
nineties. In Ukraine the products were taken care of by independent Ukrainian 
distributors who supplied the local market. Until 1998 the Polish unit was not 
able to export anything officially to Ukraine, because it would have been 
against the group’s rules. However, as Esselte in Poland was working with 
Polish distributors that were also present on the Ukrainian market they could 
not forbid them to sell Esselte’s products. Thus, until 1998 Esselte’s products 
ended up in Ukraine through both Polish distributors and the French subsidiary. 
 
Esselte has presently four official distributors in Ukraine that are all Ukrainian 
firms. Three of them were taken over in 1998 from the French who had worked 
with them for several years. The fourth one is a distributor that is not supplied 
directly by Esselte Poland, but through one of Esselte’s Polish distributors. This 
contact was established by the Polish distributor itself, which approached 
Esselte and explained that there was a Ukrainian client or distributor who 
wanted to sell Esselte’s products in Ukraine. Since the Ukrainian firm is a 
customer of Esselte’s Polish distributor Esselte cannot sell directly to them. 
However, they have made a settlement wherein Esselte is able to control the 
amount of sales that are made by the Polish distributor to the Ukrainian 
counterpart. In exchange the Polish distributor gets lower prices on the 
products it sells to the Ukrainian distributor. 
 
Overall, many of Esselte’s distributors in Poland do export to Ukrainian 
customers. But, how many and how much is not known. At least a partial 
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explanation for this phenomenon is that during trade fairs that take place in 
Poland a lot of contacts are created between Polish and Ukrainian firms who 
decide to trade with each other. Moreover, Esselte’s exclusive distributor in 
Belarus and the Russian unit’s official distributors, who also export to 
Ukrainian clients, create another sales canal into Ukraine. This has created 
some controversy since the Russian subsidiary does according to group rules 
not have the right to sell to Ukraine. 
 
Since Esselte took over the business on the Ukrainian market 1998 sales have 
been expanding impressively, approximately 200 % during the four years. 
Today the exact size of the Ukrainian market is unknown. It is difficult to 
believe in statistical figures, because they are believed to be false. Thus, there 
exists no statistics on market size. Even Esselte’s own size of sales in Ukraine 
is difficult to estimate. Esselte’s exports to the three official Ukrainian 
distributors are expected to be roughly four per cent of the size compared to the 
Polish market. However, the Polish distributors export to Ukraine as well and 
they might sell as much as 15 per cent of the products sold to them in Ukraine. 
 
A few years ago Esselte Poland established a sort of a small-scale unofficial 
license assembly with one of its Ukrainian distributors. Due to high 
transportation costs of file folders an agreement was made that the Polish 
Esselte unit would sell the folder covers separately from the mechanisms that 
are inside them and thus save money on first of all more cost effective 
transportation since complete folders require more space in a truck. Moreover, 
costs were going to be saved on the fact that the total customs duties on the 
components are lower than on the ready-made product. To be able to assemble 
the two components the Ukrainian counterpart had to buy a machine that could 
manage it. As a result the Ukrainian counterpart today operates a mini-
production facility with 2-3 employees in an economic zone. Recently, another 
one of Esselte’s distributors made a similar agreement and bought a machine 
for assembly. There has been no financial risk associated with the assembly in 
Ukraine since no investments have been made. 
 
Important for Esselte is that the distributors will live up to the agreed quality 
level of the fabricated folders. Therefore, Esselte tries to control the quality. 
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Since there was no written agreement signed about the assembly Esselte has no 
legal documents to lean on. Anyway, a general perception is that even if there 
was a signed contract it would have no value since the legal system does not 
seem to have any effect. 
 
Even if Esselte in Poland has good contacts with its distributors in Ukraine 
payment in advance is required from them at all purchases. No matter how 
good the relations are there is always insecurity connected to dealing with 
Ukrainian firms, since it is impossible to know if the firms will pay or even 
exist tomorrow. The uncertainty rises from well-known anecdotes about so 
called “balloon companies” that appear on the market and run businesses. 
When the fiscal year ends the firm is gone and it never shows up again. The 
reason for this behavior is thought to come from the desire to avoid taxes and 
liabilities. Furthermore, Esselte once had a Ukrainian distributor who was in 
those days supplied by the French subsidiary. The French had sold on export 
credit insurance and were not paid. Thus, when the Polish unit took over they 
got rid of the indebted firm that was one of its official distributors. 
 
A further complication concerning payment is the fact that Esselte in Poland is 
not able to take advantage of the services that are offered by the Polish Export 
Credit Insurance Cooperation and thus give its distributors sales credits. The 
problem arises from the Ukrainian distributors’ pursuit of avoiding customs 
duties and other costs associated with importing goods from Poland. As the 
distributors make an order they want Esselte in Poland to address the invoice to 
different as well as unknown companies each time and thus not to the 
distributor itself even if it is the receiver of the goods. Due to this procedure 
Esselte cannot get an export credit insurance because the companies that are 
addressed in the invoices are not credible. 
 
As a major barrier to further expansion is that the Ukrainian firm landscape is 
so intricate due to all the new firms (balloon companies) that are established. 
This makes it difficult to reach them and to know who the owner is or the 
person who Esselte should negotiate with. Thus, to find new distributors, which 
is Esselte’s intention is hard. Furthermore, if you do not know Russian doing 
business in Ukraine will be difficult. 
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5.3.4 Future Development and Expansion 
The market for office supplies in Ukraine is expected to continue to grow in the 
future. At present, Esselte aims to increase its distribution network and sales in 
Ukraine, because of strong growth. For this task two persons who know 
Russian have been hired that are going to travel to Ukraine and regularly meet 
the existing Ukrainian distributors and new potential ones. It is believed that a 
contact between two persons is better if they meet personally than speaking on 
the telephone. The expectation is that Esselte can get to know more about the 
market situation and increase sales by being more effective in negotiations and 
thus the employment of the two persons would pay off. 
 
A decision to locate production in Ukraine is probably not an issue at present. 
In fact, Esselte’s management takes these decisions centrally since they 
concern the whole Esselte group strategy. At present, the factory in Korzenice 
is doing well supplying the Eastern European markets. 
 
5.4 Sapa Aluminium 
Information regarding the case of Sapa and the firm’s activities in Eastern 
Europe were collected at an interview with Commercial Consultant Elżbieta 
Pawłowska-Sapun at the subsidiary’s head office in Trzianka, western Poland 
on 25 October 2002. Mrs. Sapun is responsible for the exporting activities to 
Ukraine. 
 
5.4.1 Introductory Company Overview 
Sapa Aluminium offers its customers aluminum profiles, which are later used 
in the clients’ own production. Aluminium profiles can be used in the 
production of almost everything such as audio-video equipment, doors, and 
windows, antennas etc. The company offers either standard profiles or 
specifically designed profiles for a client’s own needs. 70 per cent of the 
turnover consists of sales of specifically designed profiles, which makes it the 
larger business area. 
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The Polish subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent company in Sweden and 
employs at present approximately 360 people. Two manufacturing units have 
been established in Poland, one in Trzianka and the second in Łódż. The Polish 
unit has yearly sales of around 35 million Euros and by that a market share of 
10-15 per cent. Before entering Poland Sapa was present on most larger 
European markets including Germany, France, the United Kingdom. 
Concerning Eastern Europe, the Sapa Group today has a production plant in 
Poland and a sales subsidiary in Lithuania as well as in Estonia. The two sales 
subsidiaries were started by the Swedish parent company and are until today 
served by the Swedish unit. 
 
5.4.2 Entry into Poland 
The Sapa Group made a serious entry into the Polish market in 1992 as it 
acquired an existing plant, which was modernized and upgraded before local 
manufacturing was launched. Earlier, the Swedish unit had sold mainly 
aluminum systems used in the construction industry directly to Polish 
customers that were interested in buying Sapa’s products. During the period 
between the exporting activities and the establishment of production there were 
no agent or sales subsidiary used. 
 
Poland became the first country in Eastern Europe where production was 
established by Sapa and is still today the only Eastern European country that 
has its own production. At that time Poland was seen as a lucrative market. 
Three years had passed since the transformation process had begun. During that 
time the construction industry had started to grow and develop and thus there 
was very strong demand for aluminum profiles, which were used in the 
construction of new buildings. Another factor that generated strong demand 
was that there were no producers of aluminum profiles in Poland. 
 
Until the late nineties the Polish unit only supplied customers on the Polish 
market and had therefore no foreign sales. All foreign inquiries that had been 
received by the Polish unit were forwarded to Sweden where they were taken 
care of. However, around 1997 the Polish subsidiary took over the task and 
started to respond to incoming inquiries from foreign customers. In connection 
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to this an export department was initiated. Since these changes, Poland is part 
of a regionalization of Europe where, for example, the Swedish unit is 
responsible for the sales in Scandinavia whereas Sapa Poland holds the 
responsibility for the whole Eastern European region. Exceptions are the 
Estonian and Lithuanian markets that are supplied buy Sapa Sweden. 
 
Today the market situation has changed. The domestic market is not as easy to 
sell to as before. Sapa Poland has therefore started to export to neighboring 
countries including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Germany and the 
former Soviet republics. Germany and the Czech Republic are the main export 
destinations. Sapa has also concentrated its marketing activities on these 
markets including Slovakia, which means that the subsidiary regularly visits 
trade fairs and its customers. The remaining markets’ exporting share is 
significantly smaller and the exports are mainly sporadic. Thus, Sapa has not 
yet made any marketing investments in these markets. The CIS-markets are, in 
addition, considered to be less safe to do business in. For example, an owner of 
a company in these markets has the ability to change the name and legal status 
of his firm five times during a period of a few years, which means that it is 
difficult to establish and invest in long-term relationships. There is a fear that a 
client who would get a normal 30-day credit on his payment will close his firm 
and open up a new one, which would make it impossible to demand payment 
for the products that were sold. Actually, Sapa has one client “on a personal 
level” that is active as a buyer with already his fourth firm. It is believed that 
the reason for this behavior comes from such companies’ interest in avoiding 
tax as well as customs payments or other liabilities. Due to this Sapa requires 
its eastern market customers to pay in advance when they intend to make a 
purchase. 
 
Totally only about 10 % of the Polish unit’s turnover is generated by exports, 
which means that the Polish plant mainly sells to domestic customers. The 
decision in what countries to concentrate the exporting and marketing activities 
is completely up to the Polish unit. The Swedish parent company does basically 
accept the Polish subsidiaries exporting strategies. 
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5.4.3 Entry into Ukraine 
Sapa has no regular cooperation with Ukrainian firms. The relations with 
Ukraine are very sporadic. A characteristic of the Ukrainian buyers is that there 
are only a few firms that have ordered their own aluminum designs since they 
have low purchasing power. Most of the Ukrainian firms are rather interested in 
standard aluminum profiles that are very often used in the production of 
furniture and offer a cheaper alternative. 
 
The first exports to Ukraine were generated in the later half of the nineties as a 
response to Ukrainian firms’ inquiries about aluminum profiles. The amounts 
that were sold were very limited. Sapa was not prepared to supply that market 
and as a result the customer arrived at the factory and organized the exporting. 
The client also had to pay beforehand, since already then it was decided that no 
credits were going to be granted. 
 
In general terms, Ukraine as well as the other CIS-markets are considered to be 
high-risk markets. It is impossible to know what in the future is going to 
happen politically or economically. However, it is believed that if a solid 
market analysis were made about Ukraine maybe the company would change 
its perception about the situation. Still, the relation to Ukrainian clients is 
different. For example, one of Sapa’s Ukrainian clients who had made a few 
purchases suddenly seemed to be more interested in the company’s machinery 
and equipment than in buying more from the subsidiary. As the customer came 
to collect the purchased goods they showed a strong interest in how the 
production process was managed. Instead of orders Sapa has received questions 
from the client regarding where and from whom the factory equipment was 
bought, since they are preparing to start an own production line of aluminum 
goods processing. 
 
On a yearly basis Sapa Poland sells 5-7 tonnes of aluminium to Ukraine. If that 
is compared to Sapa Poland’s total production of 8000-9000 tonnes a year, then 
it is obvious that the supply to Ukraine is limited. The Ukrainian sales 
correspond to an amount of roughly 25 000 Euros, which is generated by two to 
three clients a year. In the beginning of the exporting activities the yearly level 
was at about 3-4 tonnes, which indicates that the amount has increased 
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modestly in real terms. These purchases have been single purchases and 
therefore the subsidiary has no long-term partners in Ukraine. The client firms 
buy and then disappear. However, it can be said that there are repeat customers. 
Yet, they are not firms but the individual owners and employees that are left 
after the old firm has changed into a new costume. 
 
Another factor that probably reduces the sales to Ukraine are two other Polish 
competitors that also sell to the Ukrainian market. Theses companies are also 
closer to the Ukrainian boarder, which probably gives them an advantage. Most 
of Sapa’s clients have come from Odessa, which is situated in southeastern part 
of the country. 
 
When the Ukrainian customer leaves the manufacturing site Sapa no more has 
control of the exported goods. What can be heard from the clients is that they 
encounter problems at the border that are related to the Ukrainian customs 
officials and police. Apparently, these officials require some kind of additional 
payments that cannot be considered legal, which indicates that there is a barrier 
to the export activities created by corruption. This corruption can, however, not 
be connected to any form of organized crime or mafia. It is a problem of 
corrupt individuals. 
 
The reason why Ukraine has received little attention is mainly due to the fact 
that the subsidiary has focused its efforts in trying to gain market positions in 
Germany and the Czech Republic. Of course, if the subsidiary receives any 
inquiries or orders from Ukraine they will be answered and realized. Sapa 
Poland is just in the beginning of expanding its exporting activities and 
therefore conquering the Ukrainian market is an issue for the future. 
 
5.4.4 Future Development and Expansion 
A rough estimate is that Sapa will within two years start deploying resources 
into the Ukrainian operations. The future aluminum sales in Poland are 
expected to stagnate or even fall. Due to this Sapa might have to become more 
expansive towards foreign markets. Ukraine holds a large potential for Sapa 
and it should be exploited. The market is perceived to be in the same situation 
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as Poland was a few years ago. There is a growing market and aluminum 
products are increasingly used in more and more industries. In order for Sapa to 
become a known brand on the Ukrainian market the company has to be present 
on the market. 
 
A factor that limits Sapas exports today is the fact that the subsidiary demands 
payment in advance, which probably has the effect that some potential clients 
turn to the offers of competitors who give them better payment conditions. The 
reasons why a firm chooses to make a purchase from Sapa are two-fold. First, 
Sapa has a short delivery time of tree to four weeks. Second, the company 
offers a high-quality product, which has so far not received any complaints 
from the clients of the CIS-countries. 
 
If the Sapa Group are to establish new production further east of Poland is a 
decision, that lies completely in the hands of the Swedish parent company. 
Sapa Poland has no right to build a new plant by its own initiative. At the 
moment Sapa has no plans of moving production or parts of it further east. 
Such actions would require large investments and, furthermore, today Sapa is 
able to fully supply all its markets. Thus there is no need of making any new 
investments in production. 
 
In the very near future Sapa intends to try to establish a long-term relationship 
with one of the subsidiary’s customers in Odessa. The firm is in the furniture 
business and uses a lot of Sapa’s standard products. Therefore, there might be a 
possibility of starting a closer cooperation with the firm. 
 
To use hired distributors for increasing sales in Ukraine is a rather unthinkable 
alternative, since the subsidiary tried to do that in the Czech Republic and in 
Slovakia without success. The companies that were employed for the task 
appeared to be unreliable in the sense that they did not carry out the work they 
were supposed to do. They did not visit clients as planned and wrote fictive 
reports to the subsidiary in Poland. Therefore, using agents is seen as 
impossible without practicing strict control over the companies. Also, there are 
costs associated with hiring such firms. Thus, the preferred way of organizing 
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exports is by doing it from the Polish headquarters and traveling to the foreign 
customers. 
 
Sapa has not established any supplier relationships in Ukraine. 
 
5.5 Wawin-Metalplast-Buk S.A. 
On 5 November 2002 an interview was conducted in Warsaw with Mr. 
Zbigniew Koźmian who was in charge for the expansion of Wawin-Metalplast-
Buk into Ukraine and lived in Kiev for several years. Today he is mainly 
occupied with the operations in the Czech Republic. The interview concerned 
mainly Wavin-Metalplast-Buk’s entry into Ukraine. The facts of establishment 
of the company in Poland was mainly taken from a previous academic study, 
which is included in a larger study by two Finnish professors (Törnroos and 
Nieminien, 1999). 
 
5.5.1 Introductory Company Overview 
Wavin-Metalplast-Buk is a producer and market leader in Poland in the 
segment plastic pipe systems, which are used in several areas and mainly in the 
construction industry. Today the company has a turnover of approximately 200 
million USD. It is a subsidiary that was created as a joint venture and its main 
owner is the Danish subsidiary of the Wavin group, Nordisk Wavin A/S, which 
posseses a majority stake in the subsidiary. The Wavin group originates from 
Holland and is the largest manufacturer of its kind in Europe and one of the 
largest in the world. The largest competitor in Europe is Uponor, a Finnish 
producer. 
 
At present the Wavin Group has 43 factories all over Europe, out of which 
three are located in Poland. The group today has sales subsidiaries in the 
majority of European countries including CEE where the company has sales 
offices in Ukraine, Russia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. There is also a 
production unit in Hungary and Lithuania. 
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5.5.2 Entry into Poland 
According to Törnroos and Nieminen (1999) the Wavin group was not present 
in any Eastern European country before the iron curtain fell in 1989. In the 
beginning of the nineties Nordisk Wavin, the Danish subsidiary in the group, 
got the responsibility for the Polish as well as the Baltic markets. This was the 
beginning of the unit’s interest in Eastern European expansion. What fuelled 
the unit’s curiosity for these markets was the slowly growing home market, the 
management’s interest in new market opportunities as well as the execess time 
they had. Moreover, politicians were at that time speaking well about Eastern 
European markets and their needs for economic recovery. 
 
Subsequently, the management started to do calculations about the market size 
and future growth opportunities. It was realized that Poland was a huge market 
due to its large population and lack of flats and that the future was going to 
offer very good business possibilities. A lot of work was also put into analyzing 
the political situation, which resulted in a positive picture about Poland’s 
political future. 
 
The company intended to commence production in Poland immediately and 
started to look for a potential counterpart with an acceptable production plant. 
Finally, after having visited and analyzed some companies a suitable candidate 
was found in the town of Buk, which at the end led to the signing of a contract 
where Nordisk Wavin acquired 51 % of the total share capital. Before the 
acquisition of the stake in the Buk factory Nordisk Wavin had not carried out 
any kind of business activities in Poland at all i.e. there were no exports to 
Poland. During further expansion in Poland two new manufacturing plants 
came to Wavin’s possession through acquisitions. 
 
According to Mr. Koźmian the Polish unit was under the responsibility of the 
Danes for several years after it had been established, as did the Baltic States. 
Today Poland has become a responsibility center and has as its duty to take 
care of the operations in the Czech Republic and Ukraine where the unit 
exports its merchandise. Poland’s advantages in being a responsibility center 
for the mentioned countries lies in the fact that it has a favorable geographical 
location, which makes it a good logistics center and that Polish businessmen 
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have an advantage since they are familiar with the Eastern European culture as 
well as business conduct. The remaining Eastern European countries have 
different units responsible for them; for example, the Danish unit controls the 
Lithuanian. On the markets where the Wavin group has no representation all 
units are welcome to sell their merchandise, which creates internal competition. 
Due to this Wawin in Poland exports also to Belarus. 
 
5.5.3 Entry into Ukraine 
In 1996, Wavin in Poland started to sell its goods to Ukrainian firms who 
arrived in Poland with the purpose to buy the subsidiary’s products. The sales 
that were made were rather sporadic and thus there was really no long-term 
cooperation between the counterparts. The subsidiary had so far not made any 
kind of marketing efforts towards Ukraine nor was there any plan to enter the 
Ukrainian market. 
 
One year later, Wavin opened a representation office in Kiev with the purpose 
to learn more about the Ukrainian market by researching it locally and 
promoting Wavin’s products. The subsidiary had already built a customer base 
in the country that motivated the opening of such a representation. 
Furthermore, there was a need to have a local representation in order to control 
the sales credits that were given to the local customers. In western markets 
Wavin can use banks or get recommendations from other suppliers as a way of 
controlling the credibility of a firm. On the other hand, in Ukraine Wavin had 
to do credit checks independently, since there were no reliable financial 
institutions offering that kind of service. Thus, the question was raised if the 
subsidiary should send its own delegations to the country to carry out the tasks 
or to hire people that would do the job locally. The latter alternative was 
considered to be considerably more cost-efficient. Another advantage of having 
a representation office in Kiev was that there were always people present who 
could deal directly with customers. 
 
In 1999, a further step was taken and a sales office was established, Wavin 
Ukraine, at the same time as a local warehouse was rented. The sales office was 
wholly owned by Wavin in Poland and served Ukrainian customers with 
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Wavin’s products directly in the country by importing them from Poland. The 
sales office enabled Wavin to be more aggressive on the market and therefore 
increase the subsidiary’s sales. Now it was possible for the company to import 
large amounts of products from Wavin Poland and to sell them in smaller 
fractions to local clients that did not want to buy large quantities. 
 
The company’s sales were from the very beginning boosted with three sales 
representatives around the country. In addition, Wavin used three distributors 
who buy goods from Wavin in Kiev and sell them directly to Ukrainian 
customers. About 90 % of the sales are realized through these counterparts. 
There is no ownership connection to these companies. The relation to them is 
purely based on mutual trust and there are no contracts written, since it is 
believed that if a distributor were to double-cross Wavin Ukraine they would 
do it regardless if there was a contract or not. Today, sales in Ukraine amount 
to around one to two million USD, which is much more than what was sold 
during the first years when sales where about a few hundred thousand USD. 
 
The sequence of steps that was taken by Wavin in Ukraine allowed the 
subsidiary to slowly learn about and understand the realities of that market as 
well as to minimize the risks. A general policy of the group is that it should be 
represented in those countries where it has notable sales. It is believed that 
without representation there is a substantial risk that a customer might change 
supplier. 
 
One of the major problems when doing business in Ukraine and importing 
goods as Wavin does is the continuously changing legal framework. For 
example, a product that has never demanded any certificate to be imported 
suddenly requires one when the transport of the goods already is waiting at the 
Polish-Ukrainian boarder. Further problems that were experienced by Wavin 
concerned the bureaucracy of agencies and difficulties in finding personnel that 
was educated to understand the western way of accounting. 
 
A temporary problem that hit the company and its market was the Russian 
crisis in 1998 that was felt in Ukraine by Wavin. Sales fell dramatically the 
following year to a zero level during a period of six months and some of 
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Wavin’s competitors left the market. However, later sales increased and today 
the situation of the company is stable again. 
 
5.5.4 Future Development and Expansion 
Going one step further and establishing production in Ukraine is not an issue 
for the near future since the market size and Wavin’s sales are too small to 
motivate investments. Opening up manufacturing in the sense of taking 
advantage of cheap local labor has also not been an attractive alternative, since 
the local suppliers of raw materials do not live up to the quality standards that 
would be required by Wavin. 
 
The basic belief is that the overall situation in Ukraine is going to improve with 
time, which will create a more friendly business environment. However, 
assuming that the political and economic situation in Ukraine remains the same 
as it is today and Wavin succeeds to raise the sales to such a level, which would 
motivate the establishment of production, then there is no other reason why 
production could not be started. Thus, investing in production is today fully 
imaginable. Again, the only factor slowing down the development is the size of 
sales. Today’s sales are simply too small to give a pleasing return on 
investment. 
 
It is possible that a decision to make an investment in Ukraine will be taken in 
the next few years. The size of the investment would, however, be relatively 
small and only concern a few product areas. Its purpose would be to minimize 
the costs of transportation and to decrease the risks that are associated with 
political decisions concerning customs duties and other factors that can harm 
the subsidiary’s exports. 
 
There is no uncertainty feeling connected to the idea of starting a 
manufacturing plant, since Wavin has created a strong know-how about the 
Ukrainian market. Furthermore, there is good preparedness among the 
employees. Hence, the question is just when Wavin will take the decision to 
invest. Investing too early would be throwing away money and a decision that 
was taken too late could hurt the company and its position on the market. 
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In the present situation the preferred type of investment in Ukraine would be 
making a green-field investment and building everything up from scratch. 
Establishing a joint venture, for example, is considered to be too risky due to 
various factors that make the counterparts less reliable. Widespread corruption 
and bribing is considered to be a big problem, which could put the foreign 
company in a dangerous position. Furthermore, cases where western partners 
are swindled are too numerous to create a safe picture about establishing a joint 
venture in Ukraine. Foreign investments in production involve large sums of 
capital and therefore exposing all this capital to high risk is out of the question. 
However, there are of course also reliable partners in Ukraine, unfortunately 
they are probably very few. Thus, finding a reliable partner is possible but 
difficult. There are a lot of Ukrainian firms who are out there looking for 
western investors, but they usually do not have the facilities and possibilities of 
being serious counterparts. Their factories and machines they possess are old to 
such an extent that it would be better to do a green-field investment form the 
very beginning. 
 
5.6 Case New Holland Poland 
The interview relating to CNH Poland was made on 28 October 2002 at the 
subsidiary head quarters in Płock together with Mr Zdzisław Kalinowski who is 
hired as an export specialist with responsibility for the Ukrainian market. 
 
5.6.1 Introductory Company Overview 
CNH Poland is a wholly owned subsidiary of CNH Global, which is part of the 
Fiat Group. Since only a few weeks ago the Polish subsidiary, which for 
several years was called Bizon, is going under the name CNH Poland. Bizon’s 
history dates back to 1992 as the company was created after the restructuring of 
a state owned producer of agricultural machinery and then in 1998 sold to the 
present owner. Today, the subsidiary produces and sells mainly grain-
harvesting combines as well as other agricultural equipment. 
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Just seven years ago Bizon employed 5000 people and had an output up to 
6000 combines a year. As the transformations process of the Eastern European 
economies continued the demand on the company’s products fell dramatically. 
Today, CNH Poland employs 680 persons and production is just a fraction of 
the amount that was produced in the earlier years. Worldwide CNH Global is a 
market leader. The company’s largest and most famous competitor is John 
Deere. CNH Poland is today independently present mainly in Belarus, Ukraine 
and Russia in the sense that the subsidiary exports its products to these markets. 
Belarus and Ukraine are the most important export markets for CNH Poland 
where 600 and 300 combines have been sold respectively. In addition, CNH 
Poland has exported a few units to Armenia. The subsidiary’s combines are 
also sold through other CNH units that are present worldwide. CNH Global has 
an additional European production plant of combines in Belgium. 
 
5.6.2 Entry into Poland 
In 1998, New Holland, as the company (CNH Global) was called in those days, 
acquired Bizon from Bank Handlowy in Warsaw S.A. Before this major 
decision was taken New Holland had been exporting combines to Poland, 
however, in very small quantities and through independent representatives. 
There was never a sales office opened before the acquisition. The motive why 
Bizon was acquired had to do with the fact that it was considered to be an 
experienced combine producer with qualified personnel and the company had a 
pleasing experience and presence in the Eastern European markets inclusive 
Poland, which are considered to be the future markets for agricultural 
machinery. Theses countries have very old machine parks that need to be 
changed. On the other hand, the western markets for combines are saturated 
and the sales that can be made are only replacement sales whereas the eastern 
markets are much more promising. 
 
CNH Poland is today geographically the closest producing unit to the eastern 
markets within the CNH group. The company has also a certain amount of 
experience from doing business with these markets. 
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Today the Polish unit produces according to the strategy of the CNH group. 
This means that combines produced in Poland are mainly exported to western 
countries where other CNH units are present and creating sales i.e. the Polish 
unit produces mainly for the needs of other CNH units. 
5.6.3 Entry into Ukraine 
In the middle of the nineties Bizon created a strategy, which was aimed at 
expanding into the Eastern European markets. As a response to that Mr 
Kalinowski took part in a sequence of agricultural machinery demonstrations in 
Ukraine where the company’s harvester was presented for potential clients. The 
marketing actions were successful and in 1998 Bizon exported 130 harvesters 
to Ukraine. 
 
However, already in 1996 Bizon had started to cooperate with The Kovel 
Agricultural Machinery Plant in order to produce combines and to make a 
commitment on the Ukrainian market. The cooperation did not succeed and 
thus no Bizon products ever came out of the factory due to problems related to 
the relationship with the Ukrainian counterpart. The only function that was 
fulfilled by the counterpart was the distribution and sales of spare parts to 
Ukrainian customers as Bizon later started to export to Ukraine. Today, CNH 
intends to give up the commitment in the Kovel engagement. 
 
In 1998 Bizon established a licensing agreement with the Malyshev Plant in 
Kharkiv to assemble combines from Polish components. According to the 
contract the Ukrainian plant was first supposed to produce a small amount and 
then gradually increase production. The Ukrainians were also expected to start 
manufacturing a certain percentage of the components that were going to be 
used in the production of the harvesters. A requirement from Bizon was that a 
certain level of quality had to be maintained, since it was considered to be 
important in the pursuit of a higher standard. However, the cooperation did not 
last long and did not work out as planned. Only a small amount was produced 
within the framework of the contract, which was terminated in 2000. The 
reason for the failure was that the Malyshev Plant did not fulfill the demanded 
standards and quality of production. 
 
 93
Empirical Findings 
After the cooperation ended the Ukrainians continued to assemble 
independently and sell the Bizon combines according to the drawings and 
know-how they had got from their Polish counterpart. Of course, they had to 
sell them under another brand name, but the product was the same. The 
combines are sold by the Ukrainians until today, which creates a problem for 
CNH since the Ukrainian customers now have difficulties in differentiating 
among the real ones and the copies. Practically, CNH has to compete with its 
own products. 
 
Why the Ukrainian counterpart failed to fulfill the requirements is not clear. It 
is assumed that they perhaps were not technically ready for more advanced 
production. Moreover, the Ukrainians mentality was perceived as very old 
fashioned, as a heritage from the communist era. They way of thinking in 
Ukraine is believed to be as it was during the days of the Soviet Union. People 
are not bound to their work and feel that they are not part of the company they 
are working for. Therefore, they do not put effort into their work and the results 
are poor. 
 
Until today CNH Poland has sold altogether about 300 combines to Ukraine. 
Present day exports to Ukraine lie in the range of 10-30 combines a year. CNH 
Poland does not use official distributors nor does the unit have a sales 
subsidiary in the country, since it is not perceived as necessary at the amounts 
that are sold. However, there are a few companies that buy from CNH and 
afterwards sell the combines to other clients i.e. they work as sort of informal 
distributors. However, their sales are not particularly large. For CNH these 
companies are seen as ordinary clients among others. The sold machines are 
serviced by special groups that are sent to Ukraine. 
 
CNH has from the very beginning had a policy of securing all its transactions 
within the Eastern European markets, while the financial condition of 
Ukrainian firms is considered to be weak and thus selling to them without 
having a guarantee of payment would be very risky. CNH Poland prefers to sell 
less with low risk than more with high risk. Therefore, a Ukrainian firm that 
wants to purchase combines from CNH Poland has to have a relation to a bank, 
which can guarantee a payment. This is a prerequisite due to the fact the CNH 
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cooperates with the Export Credit Insurance Corporation in Poland, which 
poses this requirement, as it has to guarantee its own payment. A problem is 
that many potential buyers are not able to get a bank guarantee since they lack 
the assets that could cover such a back-up. Payment in advance is another 
option, however, not so common. A gentleman’s word or handshake can by no 
means be accepted due to the insecurity of Ukrainian firms. Everything has to 
be financially secured. 
 
5.6.4 Future Development and Expansion 
CNH Poland has in general terms a positive outlook regarding the Ukrainian 
economy and the financial situation of the local firms. The subsidiary does not 
aim at conquering the whole Ukrainian market. They will be satisfied with a 
modest share by selling the amount the subsidiary is producing. A larger 
market share would require enormous investments in new production facilities. 
 
CNH is in the future ready to try production/assembly again in Ukraine. 
However, the exported amount today is not considered to be large enough to 
motivate local production. Making a green field investment is out of the 
question since it would be too resource demanding. What could be imagined is 
working together with a Ukrainian counterpart, for example, through a joint 
venture. The subsidiary is ready for offers from serious companies that possess 
the right equipment, people and finances. The counterpart would also have to 
be properly analyzed for its ability to fulfill the requirements of CNH. The 
assembly would be based on parts that were partly produced by the Polish unit 
and partly by the Ukrainian plant, with the share of Ukrainian produced parts 
growing with time. The Ukrainian plant would also in the beginning only 
manufacture simpler units. 
 
Generally speaking, the major barrier to production is that the Ukrainian firms 
that would be interested in cooperation are very eager to collaborate, but 
usually completely lack the capacity to do it and, in addition, are in a bad 
financial situation. There are numerous amounts of factories in Ukraine today 
that are looking for a foreign partner to start production with, nevertheless only 
a very few companies can offer acceptable conditions.  
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As the Polish unit is today part of the CNH group all decisions about future 
production abroad are connected to the group management and its strategies 
relating to production. Thus, the final word about establishing production in 
Ukraine in the future will be in the hands of the parent company. If the 
production would concern combine harvesters, then Polish representatives 
would most likely, in some way, coordinate the operations. 
 
Ukraine is the fastest growing market out of all the former Soviet republics for 
CNH Poland and its combines. In the future, Ukraine is believed to grow fast 
and to become one of the largest markets and partners for the Polish CNH unit. 
One major barrier that limits the relations to Ukraine is corruption, which in 
fact is a huge problem in all the former Soviet republics. CNH in Poland has a 
policy of not taking part in any kind of informal agreement, which limits its 
business opportunities. 
 
5.7 Prim S.A. 
Two interviews were made at Prim’s headquarters in Lublin on 4 November 
2002. The first one with the company CEO Mr. Julian Rakoczy and a second 
one with an employee within marketing Mr. Jerzy Sawczak who dealt with 
Prim’s entry into Ukraine from the very beginning. 
 
5.7.1 Introductory Company Overview 
Prim S.A. is a producer of pre-isolated pipe systems, which are used in the 
construction of warm water systems. The subsidiary employs about 90 people 
and has a turnover of about five million USD. Sales activities are driven across 
many European countries, mainly those that are closely situated to the east and 
west of Poland. Some sales have also been made to markets in Asia. In recent 
years exports to neighboring Eastern European countries have increased, most 
notably to Belarus and Kaliningrad (Russia). Profitability is pushed down by 
fierce competition from western competitors such as Alstom, a former ABB 
unit. 
 
 96 
 
Chapter V 
A major shareholder in the company is the Norwegian pipe producer 
Powerpipe Systems, which is mainly active on the Swedish market. At present 
Powerpipe owns 44 % of Prim’s stocks. However, previously it was for several 
years the majority shareholder. The company employs 50 persons and has a 
turnover of about 150 million SEK. Its major market is Sweden. Other markets 
that are supplied are Norway, Finland, Russia, Holland and the Balkans.  
 
5.7.2 Entry into Poland 
In 1994, Powerpipe acquired a major share of 55 % of the total stocks in Prim. 
The main underlying motive behind Power Pipe’s acquisition of Prim was that 
Prim was seen as well established in Poland and other Eastern European 
markets, which would allow the company to enter theses markets relatively 
quickly. Prim’s presence on the Ukrainian market was a major factor 
contributing to Powerpipe’s interest in acquiring the company. Furthermore, 
Prim as it was state-owned was looking for a strategic investor and this 
coincided with Powerpipe’s intention to buy an Eastern European pipe 
manufacturer. During a short period the company raised its share to 60%. 
Today, Powerpipe controls 44 % of the stocks after several share issues have 
been made, which have decreased the company’s ownership in Prim. Another 
major shareholder in Prim is Węglostal S.A with a present share of slightly 
over 48 %. 
 
The cooperation between Power Pipe and its Polish subsidiary was in the 
beginning supposed to be based on two-way collaboration. The Poles were 
going to manufacture goods that were labor-intensive and deliver them to 
Power Pipe, whereas the Swedes were going to produce some type of pipes that 
the Polish unit did not make. However, these intentions remained largely 
unrealized since Powerpipe went into bankruptcy not long after Prim had been 
acquired. The company was later reactivated and today there exists only an 
intention to start cooperating again. 
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5.7.3 Entry into Ukraine 
Prim started to export to Ukraine in the beginning of the nineties. At first, the 
exports were carried out by people from Prim’s plant in Poland who traveled to 
Ukraine and installed the pipe systems that had been ordered by Ukrainian 
clients. The interest for the market grew out of both private and business 
contacts with Ukraine that resulted in business transactions. Many of the 
contacts were created at trade fairs in Ukraine. At this time, personal relations 
were of critical importance since public procurement did not exist and sales 
were therefore only made with those who personal relations had been built 
with. Thus, this was considered important due to the fact that the Ukrainian 
market for pre-isolated pipes was very large and growing. Generally, the good 
relations to Ukraine are believed to have risen from the proximity of Lublin to 
the Ukrainian boarder.  
 
At a later stage the exporting activities were taken over by a Ukrainian firm 
based in Lviv, Energoresource, which was looking for a pipes producer whose 
products it could distribute and sell. In 1994, Prim established production in 
Ukraine as it was believed that the sales were large enough to motivate 
production. This was not long before the major share acquisition in Prim by 
Powerpipe. The new manufacturing unit was established as a joint venture with 
Energoresource. In the newly established joint venture and Prim’s share of the 
total stocks was 30 %.  The other major shareholder was the Lviv Physic-
Mechanical Institute, which held a share of 50 %. The institute was believed to 
be a strong partner due to its sheer size with over 2000 scientists and its 
widespread contacts and know-how about the Ukrainian market. A key strength 
of the Physic-Mechanical Institute was that its contacts were mainly in the 
sphere of important former communist party members and military personnel. 
These people remained after the transformation had begun in important 
positions and thus the newly established venture possessed a huge advantage 
making things easier for it. For example, Energoresource started to win a lot of 
public procurement contracts. 
 
By launching production in Ukraine Prim’s objective was to decrease the costs 
and lower the price of pre-isolated pipes that were going to be sold to 
Ukrainian customers. The ambition was to offer even lower prices than ABB 
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did, which was the only foreign pipe producer in Ukraine except for Prim. At 
the same time, Prim was supposed to continue exporting additional elements 
that were not going to be produced at the new plant. Also, at that time a general 
policy in Ukraine emerged, which advocated that buying from domestic 
producers was better for the country and should therefore be promoted. This 
was seen as a chance for Prim. Moreover, in relation to other CIS-markets 
producing in Ukraine had the advantage that it was easy to convert profits to 
the desirable currency and to transfer them from a Ukrainian subsidiary to 
Poland. 
 
Prim contributed by bringing in technological know-how and machines that 
were later used in the production. The unit developed fast and became the 
largest producer of pre-isolated pipes in the whole Ukraine. During this time an 
effort was made to enable Power Pipe in Sweden to export certain products to 
Ukraine that were not produced by Prim or the local plant. It all came to a 
turning point as Powerpipe went into bankruptcy. During this time more 
problems started to occur. One of the major problems was that the customs 
duties on the products that were exported by Prim to Energoresource were 
suddenly raised dramatically. The management of the joint venture, which was 
mainly Ukrainian, had noted that the newly established company had expanded 
its sales very fast and decided therefore to block the Polish exports with the 
help of their contacts in Ukrainian ministries and thus make the Ukrainian plant 
more independent. The result was that Prim’s exports of certain goods were not 
profitable anymore. Gradually, Energoresource started to produce the product 
categories that had fallen out as a result of the blocking of the Polish exports. 
 
Finally, the joint venture was believed to be on the verge of bankruptcy. Thus, 
due to a weak Ukrainian economy and low profitability at the Lviv plant a 
decision was taken in 2002 to sell Prim’s share. Today, the plant in Ukraine is 
fully independent and produces a full product range for pre-isolated pipe 
systems. What has remained is relatively small cooperation on an export-import 
basis. Prim imports some goods from Energoresource, but also exports some to 
its counterpart. The company has no Ukrainian clients that it sells its products 
to directly. 
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The main problem during Prim’s expansion into Ukraine was that the 
Ukrainian clients were very eager to buy, but less interested in paying. Thus, 
one of the main reasons why Prim started to work with Energoresource was 
that they had certain connections to different ministries, which allowed them to 
guarantee payment form Ukrainian clients in an unofficial way that created 
motivation to pay. Guaranteeing payment was in Ukraine perceived to be more 
difficult than, for example, in Belarus where all purchases were always 
centralized and which meant that there was always somebody who was 
responsible on a higher level who the company could turn to. In Ukraine there 
was simply nobody to turn to and to hold responsible. Therefore, Prim also 
demanded that Ukrainian customers in some cases had to pay in advance. 
 
5.7.4 Future Development and Expansion 
The Ukrainian market is seen as a future market for the type of products that 
are sold by Prim. Today, the pre-isolated pipes market is large, about 80 % of 
the Polish. However, the growth of the market is non-existent because the state 
does not prioritize projects that would create market opportunities for a new 
type of pipes that Prim produces and sells today. Furthermore, many companies 
who would have been clients have gone into bankruptcy. However, in the 
future when the Ukrainian economy really starts to develop and grow the 
market potential is expected to become enormous. Therefore, investing in 
Ukraine is an attractive option for the future. 
 
Prim aims at re-entering the Ukrainian market. However, the future expansion 
that is going to be made will be in close cooperation with Powerpipe. A general 
trend that can be seen is that the market for pre-isolated pipes in Ukraine is 
actually declining. Thus, the foreign pipe producers that are present in Ukraine 
have started to close their offices and decided to deal only with direct exporting 
to existing clients. Due to this development Prim has in the near future no 
intention other than exporting directly to the customers. 
 
Today, Prim produces certain types of pipes that are yet not existent on the 
Ukrainian market. These products are newly developed and therefore 
Energoresource does not possess the capacity to develop similar products. The 
 100 
 
Chapter V 
problem is that the Ukrainian market is not mature enough and does therefore 
not demand these kind of products yet. 
 
Making a green-field investment in Ukraine is in the case of Prim not possible, 
since the company does not possess enough capital, which would be required 
for such an undertaking. However, even if there would be a chance to finance a 
large investment it would imply a very high risk. It is believed that there is no 
state guarantee in the sense of a legal system that can secure the investment. 
The political situation might suddenly change and the new government might 
decide to take over and nationalize an already made investment. 
 
Therefore, as long as there is no secure legal system and stable political system, 
Prim would not make any green-field investment even if the company would 
have the required financial sources. Not even strong personal contacts with 
important politicians are believed to create long-term security for a foreign 
company. A person who is a minister today might tomorrow not be in the same 
important situation anymore. 
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6 WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
The within-case analysis aims at making an independent analysis of each case 
study. This implies that the case findings are categorized according to and 
compared with the utilized theories. Furthermore, this section includes some 
comments on certain aspects of interest. It should also be seen as a part 
explanation to the posed study questions. 
6.1 Can-Pack 
Can-Pack was established rapidly on the Polish market as high commitment 
manufacturing was launched followed by the opening up of additional 
production plants. Poland became the first European market that was entered 
by the parent company, F&P Holding. The main reasons for the entry were the 
lucrative market with its future potential and the fact that Poland was 
considered to be a stable market in the region. Hence, two types of location-
specific advantages were fulfilled, market and political conditions, which 
motivated starting production. Since sales were initially only meant for the 
Polish market the company pursued a market-oriented strategy. 
 
Even if Can-Pack initially did not have any concrete plans for entering new 
markets the subsidiary started to grow interest for the Ukrainian market and its 
clients after it had operated a few years in Poland. Thus, market size and 
growth opportunities were the main initial sparks that started the subsidiary’s 
entry into Ukraine. Furthermore, geographical proximity was considered to be 
an important factor that fueled market entry. Since Can-Pack was the only unit 
of F&P Holding operating in Europe the responsibility for all regional markets 
was Can-Pack’s. 
 
According to the reviewed literature companies that enter Eastern European 
markets and especially the CIS-markets generally use low commitment modes 
in order to minimize the high risk of operating on these markets. Furthermore, 
there should follow a sequence of operation modes with growing commitment. 
In the case of Can-Pack this is a very obvious pattern. As the company first 
started doing business in Ukraine it was simply through sporadic exports. At a 
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later stage a sales subsidiary was opened and finally a joint venture 
manufacturing unit was established. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Operation Modes used by Can-Pack as Entering Ukraine 
 
One factor that slowed down this process was the weak financial situation of 
the Ukrainian customers who generally prefer lower priced good, which is a 
segment that Can-Pack does not supply. Therefore, low purchasing power and a 
weak overall economy can be seen as reasons for the emergence of a whole 
chain of modes. Moreover, another factor that can be related to the slow 
process is the uncertainty connected to Ukrainian clients. Since the company 
could not trust them due to the perceived market situation derived from own 
research and general market as well as relationship knowledge, it limited their 
customer base as Can-Pack drove a hard line of securing all sales either by 
requiring payment in advance or bank guarantees. 
 
Low commitment in the case of Can-Pack becomes apparent when looking at 
the final operations step. First of all, production was established by creating a 
joint venture in order to avoid risks associated with the market’s hostility to 
foreign companies, which could have resulted in poor sales. Second, Can-
Pack’s investment was intended for the production of only one product 
category and thus the investment was relatively small in size. Ukraine is by the 
company considered to be an unstable and unpredictable market. 
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As already touched upon Can-Pack’s exports were the result of the company’s 
pursuit of new sales opportunities. As sales grew and the Ukrainian market 
became more important it was realized that establishing a sales subsidiary 
would allow the company to control its sales better and increase its presence on 
the market. Production in co-operation with a counterpart was going to function 
as a mental bridge to the Ukrainian customers in order to make sales possible. 
This shows an example of how the market was perceived and how Can-Pack 
tried to overcome a market barrier associated with ongoing behavioral change 
by taking advantage of a relationship with a locally established actor, which is 
common in Eastern Europe according to existing research. 
 
From Can-Packs point of view the major obstacles to further market 
commitment arise from a weak economy, which holds financially weak 
customers that limit the size of the market for certain goods and customers that 
are insecure to the extent that doing business with them means high risk taking. 
Furthermore, Ukraine is seen as an unpredictable market, which makes the 
subsidiary aversive towards increasing its market commitment. These findings 
are in line with previously done research on the business environment in 
Eastern Europe in the sense that they support the concept of the effects that the 
transition environment has on foreign companies. 
 
6.2 Delphi Poland 
After the Polish market had been supplied by exports for a certain time Delphi 
made a series of serious commitments as it acquired several factories in the 
country in an effort to make Poland into a production center for the group on 
the basis of cheap labor. Since the unit’s objective was to supply not only the 
Polish market Delphi’s production strategy could be labeled as supply-based 
and cost-oriented. The two main reasons why the company started its 
expansion in Poland were, first, the market opportunities that were attractive 
due to the existence of several automobile producers. Second, the country was 
considered to have a lower operating risk than other markets in the region. 
Therefore, the main location-specific advantages can be referred to as the 
market and political situation. 
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The explanation behind Delphi Poland’s entry into Ukraine is probably 
somewhat uncommon. As a result of taking over the activities in Ukraine the 
Polish subsidiary became fully responsible for the aftermarket activities in the 
country. In other words, this means that the takeover of the responsibility for 
Ukraine from Delphi Russia was the main reason for the Polish unit’s 
expansion into Ukraine. Today, the responsibility stretches to all neighboring 
countries east of Poland. 
 
Since Delphi Poland probably still is in an early phase of expansion into 
Ukraine no chain of operation modes can be distinguished. However, it can be 
said that the Polish subsidiary has started its way into the Ukraine in a cautious 
way. The operation modes that are used in order to reach the market can be 
seen as low commitment alternatives since the subsidiary practically exposes 
itself to very little risk by not deploying many resources to the market in the 
sense that Delphi Poland uses both independent domestic and Ukrainian 
distributors. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Operation Modes used by Delphi Poland as Entering Ukraine 
 
What motivated the use of such distributors is basically the high perceived risk 
associated with operating on the Ukrainian market in comparison to the returns 
an investment would give. This has made Delphi Poland highly cautious with 
respect to its commitments and costs of being present on the market. In 
addition, bad experiences from the Russian crisis have made the company 
rethink its approach to transition markets. 
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Working with only one Ukrainian distributor is seen as advantageous due to the 
fact that it is thought to be easy to work with only one counterpart. The 
Ukrainian distributor is large in size and manages the distribution according to 
the Polish subsidiary’s expectations. Furthermore, since the distributor has long 
experience of handling cross-border trade and its specifics that can be related to 
the effects of transition such as corruption, it would therefore be difficult to 
take over the tasks. Hence, this is a typical case of using relationships in 
transition economies as a way of handling the lack of effective institutional 
regulation. Thus, the case of Delphi Poland illustrates very clearly a rather 
common occurrence in Eastern Europe. Here it emerges as a barrier to further 
commitment. 
 
The cooperation with the two Polish-based export merchants started simply as 
the company acquired a factory and thus created relationships with two firms 
that were distributing the factory’s merchandise to Ukraine. Thus, there was 
probably no reason not to continue working with them. 
 
Two major barriers to further commitment exist in the case of Delphi Poland. 
First, the perceived risk on the market is too high and does therefore not justify 
any major investment. Second, the overall market is too small to make it 
attractive. If in the future no automobile manufacturer enters the market it is 
unlikely that the company will make any investment in Ukraine seen from a 
market-oriented perspective. On the other hand, investing in order to make use 
of cheap labor is possible. 
 
6.3 Esselte Poland 
Esselte’s development in Poland has been highly dynamic. From operating a 
small-scale production plant in the early nineties the subsidiary has expanded 
its activities enormously. Today Poland houses Esselte’s European production 
center. Due to this and the fact that Esselte’s initial investment concerned 
production that was aimed at the Swedish market it can be said that the 
company from the beginning principally has followed a supply and cost-
oriented production strategy. Since a major reason for the company’s entry into 
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Poland was labor cost the location-specific advantage could be defined as lower 
production costs. However, later as sales began to develop in Poland it could be 
said that Esselte’s production became also market-oriented. 
 
Esselte Poland’s entry into Ukraine can actually be divided up in two phases. 
The first one would concern the subsidiary’s early nineties business as goods 
were transferred from Poland to Ukraine by the unit’s Polish-based distributors 
that had found customers in the country. This could be said to be an unofficial 
entry. The second phase of entry emerged as the Polish unit was given 
responsibility for the Ukrainian and Belorussian market. Now the Polish 
subsidiary could engage in official business activities with the two countries. 
 
Even tough Esselte Poland still is in a relatively early phase of expansion into 
Ukraine, as the subsidiary has been officially supplying the market for about 
four years, a chain of operation modes and gradually increasing but low 
commitment can already be distinguished. The subsidiary has so far only used 
an increasing amount of independent actors to reach the market. It seems that 
instead of going a step further and establishing physical presence in Ukraine 
Esselte Poland has expanded its activities in a sort of horizontal manner by 
developing sales through adding distributors. This can be considered as less 
resource demanding and therefore also as less risky. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Operation Modes used by Esselte Poland as Entering Ukraine 
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The Ukrainian expansion seems to be at least partly out of control for the 
subsidiary since there are so many independent parties that are dealing with the 
market. Due to this it is not exactly known how much is sold to the market, a 
figure that is crucial in the internationalization context. The company is also 
troubled by the fact that there is no reliable statistical source, which could 
confirm market Ukrainian market size. 
 
An additional sign of the risk aversion towards the Ukrainian market is 
demonstrated by the modest assembly operations that have been established in 
cooperation with one of the official Ukrainian distributors. These projects have 
probably only been possible due to the fact that no financial risk is associated 
with them. 
 
The explanation why the Polish subsidiary has used only low commitment 
operation modes can mainly be referred to the perception of Ukraine being a 
high-risk and uncertain market environment as also experienced by Esselte 
France. However, Esselte Poland works also with Polish-based distributors that 
account for a significant share of the exports to Ukraine. Since these 
distributors are Polish companies they most certainly offer the subsidiary a less 
risky form of dealing with Ukraine at least in the eyes of Esselte. Thus, these 
relationships are used to overcome the insecurities associated with dealing on 
the Ukrainian market as well as with Ukrainian counterparts. 
 
As Esselte aims to continue increasing its distributor base one of the main 
barriers will be to establish new relationships due to the intricate firm 
landscape in Ukraine. Furthermore, since the legal system is perceived to be 
weak and Ukrainian firms unreliable to deal with, establishing new 
relationships is expected to be difficult. However, Esselte Poland counts on 
rising sales additionally with the subsidiary’s new commitment in hiring 
traveling export sales representatives. 
 
6.4 Sapa Poland 
Preceded by limited exports from the parent company to Poland Sapa 
established the company’s first and until today only production site in Eastern 
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Europe on Polish soil. The main reason and the determining location-specific 
advantage for this establishment was the growing and attractive market for 
Sapa’s products. As the production facilities in the beginning were aimed at 
Polish customers only this type of production in those days could be classified 
as market-oriented. 
 
A turning point in the Polish subsidiary’s operations came in the later half of 
the nineties as Sapa Poland started to respond to incoming foreign inquiries and 
as an export department was initiated. Among these inquiries there were 
Ukrainian firms that were interested in Sapa’s manufactures. Thus, the initial 
reason for entry into Ukraine came as a response to interest shown by 
Ukrainian counterparts. Today the Polish subsidiary is responsible for and 
exports to almost the whole Eastern European region. 
 
The subsidiary has barely begun its Ukrainian expansion. Therefore, no chain 
of operation modes can be distinguished, at least not yet. But, what can be seen 
is that the subsidiary’s approach towards Ukrainian customers is cautious. 
Thus, commitment towards them is limited. No sales credits are given to them 
since own observations and experiences from Eastern European markets have 
shown that regional counterparts very often prove to be insecure and difficult to 
build relationships with. In other words, dealing with Ukrainian firms is related 
to high risk, which is avoided as far as possible. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Operation Modes used by Sapa Poland as Entering Ukraine 
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An advantage that comes with having the clients take care of the exports to 
Ukraine instead of doing it independently is that Sapa does not have to deal 
with the complicated procedures occurring in connection with the boarder 
controls that are associated with corruption. Thus, the company takes 
advantage of the Ukrainian firms to get into the market, as they are probably 
more experienced with such conduct. In this way Sapa can manage the fragile 
transition environment through its short-term relationships. Moreover, dealing 
with Ukraine on an export basis allows the Polish subsidiary to make sales 
without having to be present on the market and exposing company capital to 
risk, which is believed to emerge from political and economic instability. 
 
At this stage the major barrier concerning deepening the entry is related to the 
creation of long-term relationships with customers, which is not an easy task 
since the Ukrainian business environment is highly unstable due to the 
insufficiencies of institutional control. There is no intention of using 
independent agents due to the fact that previous experience from other 
transition countries, which was negative and costly. As long as Ukraine will not 
be prioritized and only given secondary attention further expansion will 
probably remain limited. 
 
6.5 Wawin-Metalplast-Buk 
Wavin established production in Poland without any preceding operations on 
the market. The majority owned manufacturing facility that was acquired 
became the company’s first production engagement in all of Eastern Europe. 
Since Wavin focused on the Polish market from the very beginning the 
company was pursuing a market-oriented production strategy. Two location-
specific advantages, market and political situation were of crucial matter when 
the decision was taken to establish production in Poland. 
 
Wavin Poland made its first sales to Ukrainian customers as they arrived at the 
Polish factory wanting to buy plastic pipes. Thus, the initiatives were taken by 
the Ukrainian counterparts and not Wavin. Today Wavin Poland has got 
responsibility for the Ukrainian as well as the Czech market. 
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Starting with no regular exporting, opening up a representation office and 
establishing a Ukrainian sales subsidiary makes Wavin Poland an excellent 
example of gradual firm internationalization according to the Uppsala-model. 
Hence, these findings also coincide with the proposed sequence of market entry 
in Eastern Europe. This pattern is believed to have emerged, first, from the 
subsidiary’s unexpected entry into the country and, second, from the perceived 
high risk of doing business in Ukraine. As further commitment has been made 
by the Polish subsidiary a solid learning process has been connected to the 
decision-making. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Operation Modes used by Wavin Poland as Entering Ukraine 
 
Low commitment becomes clear in the sense that Wavin Poland has only hired 
a small sales force, which is supported by much larger and more important 
local distributors. Furthermore, the subsidiary had not carried out any kind of 
marketing activities towards Ukrainian customers before it started to export. 
Thus, it could be said that even if Wavin has come relatively far in its entry 
process the approach towards Ukraine has been rather gradual and risk-
avoiding. 
 
Each step in the sequence of operating modes that have been used can be 
related to inadequacies caused by the transition process. First, the opening up 
of a representation office had as purpose to overcome the lack of reliable 
financial institutions that could verify customers’ economic conditions. On the 
other hand, launching a sales subsidiary helped Wavin to reach those customers 
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that did not want to buy large quantities of goods. This can be referred to the 
fact that the Ukrainian economy is still small and the purchasing power among 
firms as well as individuals is low. 
 
In addition the case of Wavin shows preference towards the use of multiple 
actors when it comes to the establishment of sales in Ukraine. Instead of 
increasing the subsidiary’s own local sales force, independent local distributors 
are used intensely to cover the market. This is seen as a part of Wavin’s attempt 
to reduce risk in an insecure environment. 
 
A major problem that affects Wavin’s operations in Ukraine is the changing 
legal framework, which blurs the regulations and procedures in cross-boarder 
trade. Since Wavin only exports and has no production in Ukraine this is the 
subsidiary’s weak point. This is also seen as a threat that could trigger the 
establishment of production in Ukraine. 
 
Another barrier to further commitment or threat concerns the insecurity of 
dealing with Ukrainian firms. Again, the underlying problem can be derived 
from an instable legal framework. Wavin Poland has no agreements with its 
distributors, since such documents are considered worthless. Naturally, this 
increases the risk level related to the Ukrainian market. Moreover, because 
Ukrainian firms are generally speaking economically and structurally weak as 
well as perceived as unreliable it hinders Wavin from establishing long-term 
relationships with them. Thus, engaging, for example, in joint venture 
manufacturing is not even considered as an alternative. However, Wavin 
Poland will probably at some point in time establish production in Ukraine.  It 
is a question of time and future market size that has to motivate such a 
commitment. 
 
6.6 CNH Poland 
CNH Poland represents a slightly different and more complicated version of the 
process of internationalization through subsidiaries in Eastern Europe due to 
the fact that the subsidiary previously was an independent firm, which after a 
certain degree of internationalization was acquired. In order to take advantage 
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of all case data both the pre- and post-acquisition phases are taken into account 
in this analysis. 
 
Before CNH Global took the step to acquire an Eastern European producer of 
grain harvesters the company had exported harvesters to Poland to a certain 
extent. Through the acquisition the company took over large production 
facilities in Poland and became engaged in production in Ukraine. The main 
location-specific advantages of starting production in Poland were market 
potential not only of Poland but also other Eastern European countries as well 
as valued human resources at the acquired factory. Since the acquisition was 
aimed at conquering several markets in addition to the Polish the production 
strategy can be defined as supply and cost-oriented. 
 
It is clear from the figure below that it does not represent a chain of operation 
modes with increasing levels of commitment that would resemble the 
establishment chain. The pre-acquisition actor tried to establish itself on the 
Ukrainian market by launching production from the very first beginning. Even 
a second attempt was made, which also failed. However, a commonality is that 
all the steps that were taken were of low commitment character. This might 
also to some extent explain the sequence of modes used. Since the attempts to 
start production did not involve large resource commitments it seems that they 
were only put up for trial; as if the company wanted to test if it was possible to 
enter the market in a rapid way without taking significant risks. Thus, basically 
there still exists a chance that a chain of operation modes with increasing levels 
of commitment will appear. 
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Figure 10 - Operation Modes used by CNH Poland as Entering Ukraine 
 
The case also reveals an interesting finding concerning the distribution of 
goods in Ukraine. Apart from CNH’s own domestic based export department 
there are also a few informal distributors that develop the Polish subsidiary’s 
sales, although this is done to a limited extent. These relationships are not the 
result of a cautious strategy but from customers’ attempts to sell CNH’s 
combines. 
 
Today CNH is back to step one as the subsidiary’s only engagement with the 
Ukrainian market is through exporting. Since sales are still relatively small 
there has been no incentive to search even for an independent distributor. 
 
Interpreting the case of CNH it is obvious that the major barrier to entry can be 
related to the creation of relationships with Ukrainian-based counterparts. This 
concerns basically the pre-acquisition phase. The findings show that none of 
the intended long-term co-operations succeeded due to shortcomings by the 
Ukrainian partners. The main problems were related to the lack of technical as 
well as mental preparedness to engage in serious cooperation. These 
weaknesses can most certainly be related to the economic and behavioral 
changes that have been created by the transition process. 
 
As CNH Poland has limited amounts of capital to its disposal making larger 
investments is not an alternative. Thus, the subsidiary needs to establish a 
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partnership in Ukraine if it intends to start producing locally. Hence, a difficult 
task waits in finding a reliable partner. 
 
A further barrier has emerged from a weak legal system, which has had its 
effects on the protection of intellectual property rights. As a result of the earlier 
co-operations CNH’s combines are today being sold on the Ukrainian market 
under another brand name. This will cause problems for the subsidiary when it 
will make an effort to gain a larger market share. 
 
6.7 Prim 
The case of Prim is also an illustration of an independent Polish company, 
which is acquired and thus becomes a subsidiary of a MNC. Powerpipe’s 
decision to acquire a major share in Prim and thus engage in production 
activities was mainly based on the location-specific advantage market potential, 
which concerned Poland and other Eastern European countries inclusive of 
Ukraine. Since the output from the overtaken factories was going to be sold to 
several markets it should be considered as supply and cost-oriented. In the pre-
acquisition phase as the still independent company entered Ukraine the main 
reason were the contacts that had been established with Ukrainian companies. 
 
The underlying reason for Prim’s first entry into Ukraine is based on the 
proactive approach the company had towards the market, as it was taking part 
in trade fairs. These operations resulted in new customer relationships that 
became the bridge to the market. 
 
Looking at the sequence of entry modes that have been used by Prim in the 
establishment process as illustrated below, it becomes obvious that the 
subsidiary has approached the Ukrainian market step by step with growing 
resource commitment to the undertaking. At first, Prim started with ordinary 
exporting from the home base. This was followed by the creation of a contact 
with a Ukrainian company that became the local distributor. Later the 
relationship was extended and the distributor became a partner in joint venture 
production. However, a setback in the relation to the Ukrainian counterpart 
forced Prim to terminate the joint venture and step down its activities in the 
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country. Thus, today the two companies have only a limited relationship and 
Prim is back to an exporting level of commitment. This cautious approach can 
be explained by two causes. First, Prim is capitally weak meaning that there is 
no room for rapid and risky commitments. Second, the Ukrainian market is 
perceived as a highly risky business environment since the political and the 
legal system are believed to be too insecure and unstable to create an 
investment friendly climate. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Operation Modes used by Prim as Entering Ukraine 
 
The employed operation modes are characterized by low commitment, which is 
normally the case when companies enter CIS-markets. As exporter, Prim never 
created its own sales subsidiary nor distribution channels. Instead a local 
actor’s resources were used in order to make sales. Most notable as regards low 
commitment is the fact that Prim engaged itself in joint venture production 
when deciding to start production in Ukraine. This also concerned only a 
minority stake. 
 
In the case of Prim the choice of operation mode has depended highly on the 
fact that the company has sought relationships with counterparts who have been 
able to support the company in the insecure transition environment and 
minimize the company’s need to make any commitment to the market in order 
to avoid risk. A good example of the first is when Prim teamed up with 
Energoresource to take advantage of the network of relationships it had with 
authorities in order to secure payments. 
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A major obstacle for a company such as Prim when establishing itself on new 
markets by developing and relying wholly on relationships with local firms is 
that the company becomes completely dependent on the counterparts it works 
with. Especially in a market environment such as a transition market, which is 
very unstable, relying on other firms is hazardous. Thus, the main problem for 
Prim is and seems to have been the creation of secure relationships with 
counterparts. The same relationship that helped the company to expand in 
Ukraine became its main threat and was the cause of its setback. 
 
The lack of capital or resources is a factor that more or less forces Prim to 
continue building its presence in Ukraine on relationships with local 
distributors and other counterparts. Therefore, making green field investments 
is not an option. Even if the company had the possibility the business 
environment in terms of the political and legal situation is considered too risky.  
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7 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
The cross-case analysis aims at bringing up commonalities and differences of 
the individual case analyses as a means of making it possible to draw 
conclusions across cases and thus answer the questions that were posed in the 
introduction of this study in more a general character. The analysis is divided 
into the three stated research questions in order to provide a more thorough 
and structured analysis. Generalizing to theory and previous finding is also 
carried out here. 
 
I. How and with what intentions was the initial market entry into 
Poland made? 
 
A commonality for all the investigated companies is that they entered Poland 
relatively rapidly by establishing high commitment production facilities without 
following a long sequence of operation modes. The majority of the initial 
commitments involved high capital investment and therefore all of the groups 
except for Powerpipe can be found among the 300 largest investors in Poland 
until 2002 (Polish Agency for Foreign Investment, 2002). 
 
All cases show that the establishment of production in Poland was of special 
character, since it put Poland in the center of the groups’ activities in Eastern 
Europe. First, Poland was in some cases either the group’s first market or only 
production facility in the Eastern European region or even on a broader 
geographical scale. Second, some cases showed that the Polish operations very 
early emerged as a group regional or global production center of a large 
product scope or single category as defined by the respondents. 
 
The two cases of Delphi and Esselte reveal that even if Poland initially was not 
meant to be the main market for the output produced by the Polish unit the 
importance of the Polish market grew rapidly as the company was present in 
the country. Still, the majority of the companies that entered Poland and went 
on to Ukraine came at first place because of a large and attractive internal 
Polish market. Therefore, it could be said that the case study companies were in 
the beginning of their operations in Poland mainly market-oriented when it 
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comes to their production. However, later as the foreign-owned Polish-based 
subsidiaries started to internationalize, among all to the CEE and CIS markets, 
their production-orientation became more supply and cost-based. 
 
Two cases showed that political stability compared to other Eastern European 
countries was, in addition to market attractiveness, a major reason for entering 
the Polish market. Only the case of Esselte points at production cost as the 
main explanation. However as stated, the Polish market became or was 
important as an output market for all the companies that at a later stage entered 
Ukraine. 
 
II. How and why does a foreign-owned subsidiary in Poland establish 
and develop a market position in additional transition markets? 
 
There is no common explanation why the subsidiaries of the foreign-owned 
firms became internationalized and what explains the subsidiaries presence in 
Ukraine. This study has shown a variety of alternatives to such initial market 
entry.  
 
First, one subsidiary was proactive in the sense that it opened its eyes for the 
neighboring country market and started to look for customers after having 
operated on the Polish market for several years. 
 
A second explanation is that subsidiaries have responded to inquiries from 
Ukrainian firms and thus have been pulled into the market without having any 
plans of entry. 
 
Third, there have been subsidiaries that have taken on a new responsibility role 
as suppliers to a market. The explanation behind this outcome proved to be that 
the Polish subsidiary had created a large production center where a broad range 
of products were produced in geographical closeness to the Ukrainian market, 
which allowed lower transportation costs. A distinction has to be made between 
this form of entry and the situation when a subsidiary gets the responsibility for 
a market that it already has been supplying. 
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A fourth explanation can be referred to the relationships that have been built 
with counterparts within networks of the subsidiary’s country of origin, Poland. 
As the case of Esselte Poland shows, the subsidiary initially entered Ukraine 
through its Polish-based distributors that had established customer relationships 
there. 
 
A final explanation to why a subsidiary became internationalized is shown by 
two cases were a MNC acquired a formerly independent Polish company that 
had expanded its activities into Ukraine. Hence, the firm became an 
internationalized subsidiary of a large corporation. 
 
The majority of these explanations can be well understood if related to existing 
theory about network internationalization or the Uppsala-model. Most initial 
market entries have, however, emerged from various sorts of new network 
relationships with various counterparts, both subsidiary internal and external. 
However, some of them represent occurrences that are not typical to firm 
internationalization at least in the more generally accepted internationalization 
models. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Foreign-Owned Subsidiary Market Entry Explanations 
 
How the foreign-owned subsidiaries internationalize was in this thesis initially 
tackled with the propositions that they would do it in a gradual step-by-step 
process and through the use of low commitment modes. Furthermore, it was 
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expected that the subsidiaries would take advantage of relationships with local 
Ukrainian actors, which is a common phenomenon especially in the CIS 
markets. 
 
The empirical findings and each individual case analysis have shown that all 
the propositions, that were based on previous findings of Eastern European 
business and market entry corresponded with them. All the cases reported first 
of all that low commitment was a general character of the employed operation 
modes.  
 
Gradual commitment was also seen in all cases except for in the case of CNH 
Poland, where the expansion into Ukraine at that time of an independent Polish 
company was initiated by establishing a licensing agreement with a Ukrainian 
counterpart. However, since the Polish company became a foreign-owned 
subsidiary first after the contractual agreement had been signed, this case and 
the one of Prim have to be given special consideration. 
 
There are a whole lot of factors that lead to low and gradual commitment in the 
operations of the investigated subsidiaries. The author believes that this is 
especially true to the investigated actors simply due to these being subsidiaries 
and the implications this has on an economic actors operations. Thus, there 
should be a qualitative difference in how a subsidiary and an individual firm 
enters a market. Several cases revealed that because of a lack of resources as 
being a subsidiary there is not even a possibility of making any larger 
engagements or rapid expansions. One case showed how the parent company 
assisted the subsidiary in establishing a foreign investment by supporting the 
financing and thus allowing it to continue its expansion. 
 
Furthermore, it was noted that since the Polish subsidiaries’ manufacturing 
facilities had grown large and handled the supplies satisfactorily there was no 
point in making any further investment or commitment in the region. Thus, it is 
in those cases considered to be enough with being present on the market 
through different modes of exports. This was emphasized by the fact that all the 
Polish-based subsidiaries exported or dealt with several markets other than 
Ukraine, including western markets. Since Ukraine was not always considered 
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to be a priority market little resources were deployed to it. Here a case when a 
subsidiary is pulled into the market without being ready for such operations can 
be considered as a good example. 
 
Otherwise the major reason why the subsidiaries have operated in a gradual 
manner and low commitment modes is the high risk that is associated with 
Ukraine. All investigated subsidiaries perceived Ukraine as a high-risk market 
in one way or the other. 
 
First of all, most of the subsidiaries perceived the Ukrainian political, legal and 
economic situation as untenable. Since the political and legal scenery is 
constantly changing it is not known what will happen. Therefore many of the 
subsidiaries reported that for them it is impossible to predict the future and thus 
the risk level. Naturally, if the risk level is unknown it must be perceived as 
very high. Several cases revealed that economic uncertainty had risen from the 
devastating consequences of the Russian crisis, which made the subsidiaries 
reflect over their commitments.  
 
Two other explanations related to high risk as well as low and gradual 
commitment arises from institutional inadequacies and firm behavioral factors. 
Experienced problems of corruption at the Polish-Ukrainian border are the 
result of corrupt customs officials and police force that have become 
institutional victims of the transition. Furthermore, Ukrainian firms have shown 
to behave in an unpredictable way by being reluctant to pay for purchases or by 
trying to double-cross their foreign partners. These are situations that are the 
outcome of conflicting interests and demonstrated the pursuit of short-term 
profit maximization among Ukrainian firms. 
 
Furthermore, several cases showed that due to a weak Ukrainian economy 
many of the customers had low purchasing power and therefore market size 
could not always be considered to motivate further commitment. 
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Figure 13 – Foreign-Owned Subsidiary Commitment in Ukraine 
 
Making use of network relationships by the Polish-based subsidiaries in 
Ukraine has proved to be done in order to avoid the whole range of previously 
mentioned risk factors and to manage the subsidiary on the market. Thus, this 
way of behavior is in line with the earlier proposed statements and previous 
findings in this area. 
 
Actually, all operating modes used by the Polish-based subsidiaries were based 
on established relationships with primarily Ukrainian but also Polish 
counterparts. Thus, none of the subsidiaries was present in Ukraine fully 
independently, neither the exporting nor the ones that have made investments.  
 
Breaking up such relationships means that the subsidiary would have to self-
manage the high risk and tasks that previously were carried out by someone 
else. Therefore, this is probably not popular. As a matter of fact, instead of 
terminating such relationships and becoming more independent there seems to 
be a tendency among some exporting subsidiaries towards increasing the 
amount and deepening the character of such relationships. The most obvious 
example is provided by Esselte Poland, which uses a very large amount of both 
Polish and Ukrainian distributors. 
 
In the exporting phase three operation modes were more frequently used than 
others. First, local Ukrainian distributors were often used as the subsidiaries’ 
main extension to the Ukrainian market. Second, relationships that had been 
created with domestic export merchants served in most situations as 
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supplementary distribution channels with the purpose of increasing sales. 
Third, domestic-based export departments were a common mode employed 
often in the beginning of the exporting activities. The Ukrainian customers 
themselves often carried out transportation of the goods from Poland to 
Ukraine, since the Polish counterparts were not prepared for such operations. 
 
The only modes of investment used by the subsidiaries in Ukraine appeared to 
be joint ventures and contractual agreements. Worth to note is that even if all 
the seven subsidiaries have been active in Ukraine for approximately 5-12 
years no single green-field investment or larger capital investment was reported 
among them. In addition, none of the establishments that involved 
manufacturing in Ukraine was self-supporting meaning that all the Polish-based 
subsidiaries that had made any kind of investment were still exporting to 
Ukraine. 
 
III. What are the major operational barriers and how do they affect 
further expansion into the transition markets in the near future? 
 
The major obstacles to further commitment of the subsidiaries lie in the same 
explanations that lead to low and gradual commitment i.e. the financial 
weakness of being subsidiaries, high risk and a weak Ukrainian economy. 
 
However, given that every single one of the studied subsidiaries is active in 
Ukraine through a counterpart, which reduces the barriers to a certain level, the 
key to further entry is dependent on the development and future of these 
relationships. This statement is based on the fact that the subsidiaries cannot 
afford to make deep capital engagements and expose themselves to high risk. 
 
Most subsidiaries intend to expand their activities in Ukraine. Many of them 
have already concrete plans for a next level of commitment. However, in the 
near future the subsidiaries will probably continue to generate low commitment 
investments and use low commitment modes since the process of transformation 
is slow. 
 
 125 
Cross-Case Analysis 
The author believes that in a long-term perspective as the political, legal and 
economic situation improves as well as the market potential, which is highly 
dependent on the economic development the foreign-owned subsidiaries will 
probably be able to become more independent in Ukraine. This would be 
possible due to a lower risk level and thus making new investments would 
probably become more common, especially since parent companies would be 
more comfortable in supporting their subsidiaries regards to investments. 
Consequently, green-field investments and higher commitment modes could 
start to appear. However, this is probably an issue that will become reality not 
until a rather long-gone future. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This last chapter concludes the most important findings from the within-case 
and above all the cross-case analysis. Furthermore, the implications of the 
findings on theory and the possibility of generalization to other situations are 
discussed. The remaining of this section is dedicated to giving 
recommendations to foreign-owned subsidiaries in Poland and further 
research in the investigated area. 
8.1 Conclusion of Major Findings 
This study has demonstrated how and why Polish-based foreign-owned 
subsidiaries become established in Ukraine through exporting or production 
engagements. The issue of what can be expected from the future has also been 
touched upon. The author believes that being present in Ukraine through some 
form of exporting is today most common since this process is still in its early 
phases. However, the future should generate more investment related 
commitments as the subsidiaries become more engaged in the Ukrainian 
market. 
 
It has been shown that the enterprises that were involved in this sort of 
operations had entered the Polish market and made substantial investments in 
production. Common for these actors is also that they have usually entered the 
Polish market relatively rapidly and engaged themselves deeply into the market 
through substantial investment in market-oriented manufacturing facilities and 
high commitment modes. 
 
The outcome of these intense actions has been that Poland or the Polish unit 
has emerged as a center for the companies’ activities in the region. This has 
been emphasized by the fact that Poland either was the first market in the 
region that was entered by the foreign company or it became the only 
established regional production facility with only group sales subsidiaries in 
other Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the center characteristic could 
have emerged from the fact that Poland was built to house a group production 
center. 
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Explanations to why these subsidiaries at a later stage have entered the 
Ukrainian market diverge from each other. Altogether, the seven cases revealed 
five reasons of market entry. First, a subsidiary could be proactive in the sense 
that it started to perform marketing activities in Ukraine with the purpose of 
attracting new customers. Second, entry was possible due to Ukrainian 
customers who ordered goods from the subsidiary in Poland, which pulled it 
into the market. Third, a subsidiary could take over the role as a supplier of a 
market that housed no independent group unit. A fourth explanation to entry 
came from a situation where a local counterpart had expanded into Ukraine and 
started to sell the subsidiary’s products. Last but not least, a reason why a 
subsidiary became established on the Ukrainian market was because it used to 
be an independent Polish company, which had entered Ukraine before it was 
acquired by a MNC. 
 
An interesting remark is that out of the five cases where the foreign-owned 
subsidiary made its market entry into Ukraine only one was proactive i.e. was 
trying to create new sales through marketing activities. Thus, presuming that 
the investigated Polish-based subsidiaries would have at the group headquarters 
had an outlined master plan or strategy for further penetration of Eastern 
European markets they were certainly not proactively fulfilled by the 
subsidiaries. This study revealed that at least the respondents were not aware of 
such comprehensive plans. Instead they pointed out the Polish market size and 
political stability as the main factors leading to entry into Poland. 
 
Studying the subsidiaries’ commitment levels revealed that extremely low and 
gradual commitment was the standard case. There are both subsidiary-internal 
as well as external factors explaining why such commitment emerged. First, 
lack of capital, satisfying supplies from Poland and the fact that Ukraine was 
not always considered to be a priority market were the internal causes. 
Externally, high perceived risk and a weak Ukrainian economy led to the 
described development. 
 
Compared to how the investigated groups entered Poland and their subsidiaries 
expanded into Ukraine, it becomes obvious that the Ukrainian expansion has 
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really been of low and gradual resource commitment. This comparison is 
especially interesting and revealing since it is made within the group. 
 
As a way of overcoming market insufficiencies all subsidiaries were reported to 
use either domestic or local network relationships. Making use of more than 
one relationship or one entry mode was an increasing and common trend. The 
most widely used exporting modes were  
 
• local Ukrainian distributors 
• domestic-based export merchants and 
• domestic exports managed by local Ukrainian customers. 
 
Interesting is that Polish distributors in some cases took part in the exporting 
activities as supplementary actors. This development is believed to have risen 
from the geographical closeness of Poland to Ukraine and the fact that several 
Polish companies have established themselves in the neighboring market. 
 
When establishing production in Ukraine the use of joint ventures and 
contractual agreements was most common. No green-field or large capital 
investments had been realized by the subsidiaries. 
 
Two cases showed that the result of a subsidiary’s internationalization was an 
acquisition of a previously independent company that had expanded its 
activities into Ukraine. Even though these subsidiaries at the time of their entry 
into Ukraine where independent companies their behavior was almost identical 
to the other actors’ performance. This is probably true because Polish 
companies as originating from a transition economy generally should be 
resource poor. Since these subsidiaries’ whole Ukrainian expansion processes 
have been studied, i.e. from the independent company’s start to the situation 
today, two phases of their internationalization have been analyzed separately - 
the pre and post acquisition phase of expansion into Ukraine. 
 
In a long-term perspective more subsidiaries should come to a point of 
expansion where the question of establishing production in Ukraine would 
become an issue. Before this will become reality above all the political, legal 
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and economic situation in Ukraine have to improve. As a result the quality of 
Ukrainian counterparts should also increase. However, the improved Ukrainian 
market environment and hence a more stable as well as lower risk environment 
could be the start of more independent activities from the point of view of a 
subsidiary. 
 
But, some companies will probably never make further engagement than 
exporting, due to various reasons such as Poland being a regional production 
center or satisfying supplies due to geographical proximity. Therefore, the 
author expects that not all subsidiaries will end up having a chain of operation 
modes as proposed by Vahlne et al (1993) and the Uppsala-model of 
internationalization. In addition, in some cases when the Polish-based 
subsidiary has come to the verge of making an investment in production it 
might become completely realized by the parent company and thus never even 
appear in the statistics or become part of the Polish subsidiary’s operations. 
 
8.2 Theoretical Implications 
To the author’s knowledge there is no framework about what leads to the 
internationalization of subsidiaries, apart from the general explanations that are 
presented by firm internationalization theories. This is even more plausible in 
the context of transition economies. Thus, no such theory was applied in the 
study. 
 
Studies that came close to this phenomenon had to do with what is termed as 
“internationalization of the second degree,” a concept that had been initiated 
by the Swedish professors Forsgren et al (1992). However, this research area 
does not deal directly with internationalization processes. Instead the 
researchers have identified internationalized subsidiaries and been looking at 
how the MNCs are affected by this phenomenon. 
 
In continued search for any related theory the author managed to get hold of 
professor Lawrence Welch, a recognized international business researcher. He 
was contacted since there was a suspicion that he might have developed a 
related theory in the past. However, professor Welch had never claimed such a 
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theory but had only infrequently referred to an article by Juul and Walters 
(1987), which brings up a discussion about firms undertaking a “bridging 
policy.” Their study revealed that some Norwegian subsidiaries in England had 
created a wider role in developing the parent company’s business in other 
foreign markets. Although this role was only limited to mainly information 
collecting and establishing contacts. 
 
Maybe the academic world has taken for granted that subsidiaries 
internationalize exactly the same way as parent companies do. Another 
explanation could be that this phenomenon has not drawn much attention to 
itself since it is probably globally seen a limited form of action. The present 
well-established theories about firm internationalization do not make any 
distinction between how or why the two separate entities expand their cross-
border activities. The author thinks, however, that there should be a separate 
explanation, especially since the prerequisites for subsidiary 
internationalization are somewhat different to that of the generally discussed 
actors. The case where a subsidiary internationalizes as an outcome of a 
structural change in the delegation of responsibility to market supply is thought 
to be an interesting explanation as well as the lack of resources. 
 
The author’s belief is that the explanations to subsidiaries’ internationalization 
can be explained with existing theories about firm internationalization. 
However, there is no framework that covers and discusses the specifics of 
subsidiary internationalization. 
 
Since it has been showed that subsidiaries use low commitment modes in their 
cross-border expansion due to several other reasons that do not have to be 
related to the Eastern European context nor just foreign-owned subsidiaries in 
Poland (e.g. lack of resources, non-priority markets), it is believed that these 
finding could be useful even in other situations and contexts. Hence, it is 
probable that the characteristics of low commitment and maybe also gradual 
commitment are common to internationalizing foreign-owned subsidiaries 
worldwide. 
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Otherwise the studied processes seem to be in line with the applied theories in 
this thesis. A remark of special interest is that the Uppsala-model, which has 
been claimed to be outdated in many respects, seems to have high applicability 
in the Eastern European context due to its explanation power of a gradual 
market commitment process. In addition, the studies that were made by Vahlne 
et al (1993) correspond to the formulated conclusions. 
 
8.3 Generalization 
An interesting question is how valid the findings of this study are to a wider 
population of foreign-owned subsidiaries in Poland that have entered the 
Ukrainian market. Generalizing from the seven cases presented here should be 
done with carefulness since the studied sample of the population has been 
small. The share of exports of the subsidiaries presented in this work in relation 
to the total of foreign subsidiary exports is just a fraction, which means that 
there are probably hundreds if not more foreign subsidiaries exporting to 
Ukraine. But, out of the 200 Polish investment related engagements in Ukraine, 
probably only a small amount is in the hands of foreign subsidiaries due to the 
lack of capital and extremely low commitment that has been demonstrated 
among the foreign-owned subsidiaries in this thesis. 
 
The strength of the case study is, however, that it allows generalization to 
theory as a means of increasing the validity of a study. In this study this has 
been done in relation to previous findings about Eastern European business. 
Convincing and well-supporting evidence has been found for the behavior of 
the investigated foreign-owned subsidiaries in relation to the general concepts 
of market entry and development in the region. Since conclusions such as low 
as well as gradual commitment modes and use of network relationships 
concerned all investigated subsidiaries due to the highly influencing transition 
environment and because they were replicated case after case, there should be a 
good platform for generalizing about how the Polish-based subsidiaries 
internationalize eastwards. 
 
Hence, it becomes tempting to conclude that a majority of the foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in Poland with extensions to Ukraine and other transition countries 
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would behave rather similarly to the conclusions that have been drawn from the 
cases of this study. At least the findings should be most generalizable for 
Ukraine. However, to what extent the findings are applicable for other 
destination countries and especially to other transition countries is more 
uncertain. Since the CIS-markets are at least according to theory relatively 
similar to each other it ought to be possible to generalize these findings also to 
them with some reservation for market variations. However, as the transition 
process progresses and the differences between the CIS-countries increase this 
conclusion will gradually lose its relevance. 
 
8.4 Recommendations to Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries in Poland 
The studied cases and previous research about Eastern European market entry 
and development indicate that the business environment, whether seen as the 
market or network relationships, in transition countries is risky and difficult to 
handle. 
 
For foreign-owned subsidiaries of MNCs the environmental burden becomes 
even more striking since they are not in a position where they can take high risk 
or make heavy investments. Thus, they are as shown in the case studies forced 
to make use of network relationships with firms that are active in Ukraine. 
Managing and developing these relationships therefore becomes a key issue. 
 
The established relationships can either be developed into a solid base of entry 
or as some cases have shown become a major setback for a subsidiary’s 
operations in the market. Low commitment attempts associated with production 
in relation with a counterpart in Ukraine seem to be less successful due to the 
problems that arise with the counterpart that the subsidiaries have chosen to 
work with. Extensive contractual agreements, licenses and minority stakes in 
joint ventures should thus in the case of Ukraine be considered as high-risk 
operation entry modes.  
 
The subsidiary that succeeded in entering Ukraine and staying on the market on 
the level of production did in fact acquire a majority stake in its joint venture, 
which prevented it from being pushed out from the cooperation. Therefore, a 
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suggestion to companies that are about to make a major commitment decision 
such as launching production in Ukraine would be to avoid being inferior to its 
eventual counterparts. Due to this the most appropriate entry forms would be 
the ones that make the subsidiary independent such as total or majority 
ownership of subsidiaries. Of course, these types of entries require resources 
and thus many subsidiaries could not afford to enter Ukraine this way. Thus, 
another strategy would be to continue entering Ukraine gradually and 
developing sales to a point where high capital investment could be covered by 
generated profits or where the parent company could be motivated to support 
the financing of, for example, a green-field investment or a majority stake in a 
joint venture. 
 
On the exporting level it has been showed that financial risk is hardly even 
taken since all exports are either secured by export credit insurances or 
payment in advance. This seems to be one of the main barriers in the initial 
stages of entry since it limits the sales, as some potential clients are not in the 
position to fulfill the requirements that are demanded in such situations. One 
solution to bridging this problem is shown in the case of Wavin where trustful 
relationships have gradually been built with distributors allowing the Polish-
based subsidiary to overcome the payment issue. However, even in this case 
the subsidiary exposes itself to a certain amount of risk. 
 
8.5 Recommendations to Further Research 
During the course of this investigation it has become clear that there has been 
little or no research done in the area of how and why subsidiaries of MNCs 
internationalize. Previous research that concerned subsidiary 
internationalization has not dealt with the internationalization processes as units 
of study. Researchers have probably for several reasons disregarded these 
issues and instead concentrated on the effects and outcomes of subsidiary 
internationalization on the structure of MNCs. 
 
However, this study has concluded that the prerequisites of subsidiary 
internationalization are different from those that concern parent companies. 
This implies that subsidiaries internationalize in a unique way, which should be 
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given more attention to in future research. Thus, more research about the 
specifics behind how and why subsidiaries internationalize is recommended. 
As this study has been limited to the Eastern European transition context it 
would also be interesting to investigate how subsidiaries expand their cross-
border activities in other business environments. 
 
More specifically, an interesting question that could be raised and focused on is 
what is the role of the parent company in these processes. Since the focus in 
this investigation was mainly on the subsidiary itself, an attempt to answer this 
question was only made from the perspective of the subsidiary i.e. the parent 
companies were not questioned about reasons and future prospects of market 
entry into Poland nor Ukraine. The present study concluded, however, that the 
operational outcomes of the subsidiaries’ behavior were rather reactive 
outcomes, since even if there were plans for further entry into Ukraine they 
were not pursued proactively,. 
 
In conclusion, there are plenty of issues that can be raised about the 
internationalization processes of foreign-owned subsidiaries. One idea that was 
not the main purpose of this study is to do research on how subsidiaries reach 
the level of 2nd degree internationalization, as defined by Forsgren et al (1992), 
which is a question that has been raised in the past but so far remained 
unexplained at least from a longitudinal process perspective. 
 
 135 

References 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Books and Articles 
Anderson E. and Weitz B. (1992) The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain 
Commitment in Distribution Channels, Journal of Marketing Research, 29, pp. 
18-34 
 
Blankenburg Holm D, Eriksson K., Johanson J. (1999) Creating Value 
Through Mutual Commitment to Business Network Relationships, Strategic 
Management Journal, 20, pp. 467-486 
 
Czinkota M. and Ronkainen I. (1998) International Marketing, 5th edition, 
Harcourt Brace & Company, Orlando 
 
Dicken P. (1998) Global Shift – Transforming the World Economy, 3rd edition, 
Harper & Row, London, pp. 182-193 
 
Domański B. (2000) Types of Investment and Locational Preferences of 
European, American and Asian Manufacturing Companies in Poland: in Polish 
Economy in Transition - Spatial Perspectives, edited by Jerzy J. Parysek and 
Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz T., Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe S.C., Poznań, 
2000, pp. 29-39 
 
Forsgren M., Holm U., Johanson J. (1992) Internationalization of the Second 
Degree – The Emergence of European-Based Centers in Swedish Firms: in 
Europe and the Multinationals – Issues and Responses of the 1990’s, edited by 
Young S. and Hamill J., Edward Elgar, London  
 
Hallén L. and Wiedersheim-Paul F. (1979) Psychic distance and buyer-seller 
interaction, Organisasjon Marked og Samfund, 16(5), pp. 308-324 
 
Håkansson H. and Johanson J. (2001) Business Network Learning, Oxford, 
Elsevier Science Ltd. 
 
137 
References 
Johanson J. and Mattsson (1988) Internationalization in Industrial Networks – 
A Network Approach: in The Internationalization of the Firm – A Reader, 
edited by Peter J. Buckley and Pervez Ghauri, Academic Press Limited, 
London, 1993, pp. 303-321 
 
Johanson J. and Vahlne J-E (1977) The Internationalization Process of the 
Firm – A Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market 
Commitment, Journal of International Business Studies, 8, Spring/Summer, pp. 
23-32 
 
Johanson J. and Vahlne J-E (2002) Business Relationship Learning and 
Commitment in the Internationalization Process, Department of Business 
Administration, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Gothenburg 
University, Gothenburg 
 
Johanson J. and Wiedersheim-Paul F. (1975) The Internationalization of the 
Firm – Four Swedish Cases, Journal of Management Studies, 12, October, pp. 
305-322 
 
Juul M. and Walters G. P. (1987) The Internationalization of Norwegian Firms 
– A Study of the U.K. Experience, Management International Review, vol. 27, 
1987/1 
 
Kotler P. (1997) Marketing Management – Analysis, Planning, Implementation 
and Control, 9th edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, pp. 409-412 
 
Kurz C. and Wittke V. (1998) Using Industrial Capacities as a way of 
Integrating the Central and Eastern European Economies: in Enlarging 
Europe – The Industrial Foundations of a New Political Reality, edited by John 
Zysman and Andrew Schwartz, University of California Press/University of 
California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, 1998, pp. 63-95 
 
Mercado S., Welford R., Prescott K. (2001) European Business, 4th edition, 
Financial Times Prentice Hall, Essex 
 
 138 
 
References 
Merriam S. (1998) Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in 
Education, Jossey-Bass Publishers, Sanfransisco 
 
Nieminen J. (1999) The Changing Business Context in the Transition 
Economies, in Business Entry in Eastern Europe – A Network and Learning 
Approach with Case Studies, edited by Törnroos and Nieminen, Kikimora 
Publications, 1999, Helsinki 
 
Nordström K. A. and Vahlne J-E (1993) Is the Globe Shrinking? Psychic 
Distance and the Establishment of Swedish Subsidiaries During the Last 100 
Years, Annual Conference of the Trade and Finance Association, Laredo, 
Texas 
 
Törnroos J-Å, Nieminen J. (1999) Business Entry in Eastern Europe – A 
Network and Learning Approach with Case Studies, Kikimora Publications, 
Helsinki 
 
Vahlne, J-E, Nordström K. A., Torbacke S. (1993) Swedish multinationals in 
Central and Eastern Europe - entry and subsequent development, RP - 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm 
 
Yin R. K., (1994) Case Study Research; Design and Methods, 2nd edition, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks 
 
Reports 
EBRD (2001) Investment Profile 2001 – Poland 
 
Foreign Trade Research Institute (1997-2002) Inwestycje Zagraniczne w 
Polsce; Raport Roczny, Warsaw 
 
Polish Agency for Foreign Investment (2002) List of Capital Investments over 
One Million USD, PAIZ 
 
UNCTAD (2001) World Investment Report: Promoting Linkages – Country 
Fact Sheet Poland, United Nations Publication, Geneva 
 139 
References 
 
World Bank (2001) Foreign Direct Investment and Integration into Global 
Production and Distribution Networks - The Case of Poland, Policy Research 
Working Paper, pp. 16, 27 
 
World Markets Research Center (2002) Country Analysis Report: Ukraine 
 
Internet sources 
Esselte, About Esselte, www.esselte.com, downloaded 2002-09-21 
 
Ukrainian-Polish Center for Cooperation, Ukraina – Inwestycje Zagranicze, 
(primary source Ukrainian Ministry of Economy), www.upcfc.org, downloaded 
2002-11-14 
 
Interviews 
Frelek Krzysztof, Exports, Delphi Automotive, 24.10.2002, Warsaw, Poland 
 
Gaczorek Rafał, Sales Manager, Can-Pack, 30.10.2002, Crakow, Poland 
 
Kalinowski Zdzisław, Export Specialist, CNH Poland, 28.10.2002, Płock, 
Poland 
 
Koźmian Zbigniew, Regional Manager, Wawin-MetalPlast-Buk, 05.11.2002, 
Warsaw, Poland 
 
Olszewski Mr, Regional Manager, Can-Pack, 06.11.2002, Telephone 
 
Rakoczy Julian, CEO, Prim, 04.11.2002, Lublin, Poland 
 
Sapun-Pawłowska Elżbieta, Commercial Consultant, Sapa Poland, 25.10.2002,  
Trzianka, Poland 
 
Sawczak Jerzy, Marketing, Prim, 04.11.2002, Lublin, Poland 
 
Strzelczyk Agnieszka, Sales Manager, Essete Poland, 05.11.2002, Warsaw 
 
 140 
 
Appendix 
APPENDIX 
 
Interview Questions 
 
Basic parent company and subsidiary information 
• Size – turnover, employees 
• Ownership 
• Products and services 
• International presence 
 
Entry into Poland 
• When did you enter the Polish market and what was the underlying 
motive? 
• What entry modes have been used? 
• For what market/s does the Polish unit produce? 
• Does Poland function as a base for entry into Ukraine/CIS? – In what 
way is it used? 
• Was it a conscious strategy in the beginning to enter Ukraine? 
 
Entry into Ukraine 
• When did you establish the initial business activities on the Ukrainian 
market and why did you do it? 
• What entry modes have been used? 
• Why have you used certain operation modes? 
• What resources have been committed to Ukraine? 
• How has the responsibility for the expansion into the Ukraine been 
shared between the Polish subsidiary and the HQ? 
• Why has the Polish subsidiary been responsible for the expansion into 
Ukraine? 
• What product categories are sold in Ukraine? – Everything or just certain 
products? 
• How has the width of activities evolved over time? 
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• How do you perceive Ukraine in terms of politics, economy, institutions, 
and business culture? 
• How do you perceive the risk level in Ukraine? 
• What are your major problems in Ukraine? 
 
Exports 
• How have your exports into Ukraine developed? 
• What are your distribution channels? 
 
Production 
• Size of investment – in money value or by describing facilities? 
• Production aimed at what market/s or purpose? – How much is sold and 
where? 
• Is the Ukrainian production more market- or cost- and export oriented? 
• Do you have established supplier relationships in Ukraine? 
 
Future Market Expansion 
• What are the main reasons why you have not made any further market 
commitment? 
• What do you expect from the Ukrainian market in the near future – 
politically and economically and in terms of sales potential? 
• How do you intend to respond to the new market conditions? 
• What are your plans for Ukraine? 
• Can you imagine yourself investing in Ukraine in the future? 
 
Supplementary Questions 
• Do you know other western subsidiaries active in Poland that have 
invested in or export to Ukraine? 
• E-mail and telephone number? 
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